## Facts

- John Bean Technologies Corporation (JBT) entered into a services agreement with labor broker Placement Pros for Placement Pros to supply contingent, temporary workers to JBT.
- The agreement stated that JBT was fully responsible for workplace safety and for supervising, directing, and evaluating the performance of the supplied workers while they were working at JBT.
- Placement Pros assigned Pedro Ybarra to work a temporary position in JBT’s machine shop performing tasks that were part of JBT’s regular operations.
- JBT trained Ybarra for the machine-shop work and assigned his daily tasks.
- Ybarra worked on JBT’s premises and used a combination of his own tools and JBT’s tools and equipment.
- Ybarra was paid by the hour by Placement Pros rather than by the job or by project completion.
- Ybarra asserted he had limited direct interaction with JBT supervisors during the workday and generally performed tasks on his own.
- While working at JBT, Ybarra had a JBT “work buddy” who inspected Ybarra’s work and approved it.
- Ybarra was injured while performing machine-shop duties at JBT and sued JBT in federal court for negligence (and related claims). His wife, Mary Ybarra, also sued based on the injury.
- JBT moved for summary judgment, arguing that California’s workers’ compensation exclusive-remedy rule applied because Ybarra was JBT’s “special employee.”

## Issues

1. Whether, under California law, Ybarra was JBT’s special employee (rather than an independent contractor) while working at JBT through Placement Pros.
2. If Ybarra was JBT’s special employee, whether California Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602 made workers’ compensation his exclusive remedy, barring tort claims against JBT for the workplace injury.

## Decision

- The court granted JBT’s motion for summary judgment.
- The court held that, on the undisputed facts, Ybarra was JBT’s special employee as a matter of law while assigned to JBT’s machine shop.
- Because the injury occurred in the course of that employment relationship and was compensable under the workers’ compensation scheme, workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy and the civil claims against JBT were barred.

## Legal Principles

- California Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602 generally make workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for an employee’s injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
- A worker supplied by a staffing agency may have two employment relationships at the same time: a general employer (the staffing agency) and a special employer (the client receiving the worker’s services).
- Special-employment status turns mainly on the special employer’s right to control the manner and details of the work; continuous hands-on supervision is not required if the right to direct the work exists.
- Courts also consider additional factors, including: whether the work is part of the alleged special employer’s regular business; whether the work is performed on the alleged special employer’s premises; who supplies tools and equipment; the method of payment (hourly wages versus payment by the job); and the right to discharge the worker from the assignment.
- Contract terms assigning to the client responsibility for supervision and safety are strong evidence that the client has the right of control typical of an employer.
- Consent to special employment may be implied when the worker knowingly accepts the assignment, follows the client’s training and work rules, and performs the client’s day-to-day work as directed.

## Conclusion

The district court concluded that JBT’s contractually assumed responsibility for supervision and safety, its training and assignment of Ybarra’s tasks, the integration of his work into JBT’s machine-shop operations, and the review of his work by a JBT “buddy” established JBT’s right to control Ybarra’s work and showed implied consent to the work arrangement; therefore, Ybarra was JBT’s special employee and his and his wife’s tort claims were barred by California workers’ compensation exclusivity.


Ybarra v. John Bean Technologies Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 997 (2012)