## Facts

- The State of Alaska hired Peter Kiewit Sons’ Company to construct a public highway to the Chena Hot Springs area; the contractor built roadwork and bridge approaches, while bridges were to be built under separate state contracts.
- Edward Krivak drove toward a cabin near the hot springs with Frank P. Young as a passenger.
- Young knew the road was under construction and had traveled in the area several times while the project was ongoing.
- A movable barricade marked the start of the construction zone, and multiple signs warned that the road was “under construction” and “closed.”
- Krivak intentionally drove past the barricade and warning signs.
- Several miles beyond the barricade, Krivak drove about 35 miles per hour toward a newly built bridge approach and did not realize until too late that no bridge existed beyond it.
- Krivak swerved off the roadway and down an embankment; Young was injured.
- Young sued the State and the contractor, alleging negligence for (1) failing to use a locking barricade to keep vehicles out and (2) failing to provide sufficient warning signs.
- After a bench trial, the trial court found that adequate warning signs and a barricade were in place and that Young had seen the signs and knew the road was closed and dangerous.
- The trial court dismissed Young’s claims on the ground that Young’s own conduct in traveling past the warnings, with knowledge of the construction conditions, constituted contributory negligence that barred recovery; the court stated it need not decide whether the defendants were negligent.
- Young appealed, arguing that contributory negligence should not apply to a passenger who had no control over the vehicle.

## Issues

1. Can a passenger, lacking control over the vehicle, be found contributorily negligent based on his own knowledge and decision to proceed into a known danger?
2. May a trial court dispose of the case on contributory negligence where that negligence would bar recovery, without making an express finding on the defendants’ primary negligence?

## Decision

- The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing Young’s claims.
- The court rejected Young’s argument that only a driver can be contributorily negligent.
- The court held that a passenger may be contributorily negligent under an ordinary-care standard tailored to a passenger’s situation, and the trial court’s findings supported that result here.
- Given the trial court’s findings that warnings were adequate and that Young knowingly proceeded beyond them, it was permissible to resolve the case on contributory negligence without deciding whether the State or the contractor was negligent.

## Legal Principles

- A passenger has a duty to use reasonable care for his own safety and may be found contributorily negligent based on his own conduct, even though he is not driving.
- Passenger contributory negligence is evaluated by what a reasonable passenger would do under the circumstances, considering the passenger’s knowledge of the risk and available steps for self-protection (such as protesting, warning the driver, or declining to proceed where reasonable).
- Under the contributory-negligence rule then applied, a plaintiff’s contributory negligence that is a proximate contributing cause of the injury is a complete bar to recovery.
- Where the factfinder determines that plaintiff’s contributory negligence independently bars recovery, the court may enter judgment on that basis without making a definitive finding on defendants’ negligence.

## Conclusion

Young v. State holds that a passenger is not immune from contributory negligence: if the passenger knows of a clear danger and still chooses to proceed, his own lack of reasonable care can bar recovery. Because the trial court found adequate road-closure warnings and found that Young knowingly traveled beyond them into the construction zone, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Young’s negligence claims without requiring an express determination of the State’s or contractor’s negligence.


Young v. State, 491 P.2d 122 (1971)