## Facts

- Laura Lee Young and James Lawrence Young married in 1942, separated in 1970, and divorced in 1977.
- The couple had two adult children; their adult son had multiple sclerosis, was physically disabled, and lived with Laura, who provided ongoing care.
- The trial court found James deserted Laura, leaving her responsible for their son, and found James guilty of cruel treatment.
- The trial court found James obtained an invalid foreign divorce without notice to Laura and entered into an invalid subsequent marriage; substantial property was accumulated during that period, and Laura was found to have an interest in it.
- The principal disputed property involved community interests in two retirement/pension plans attributable to James’s employment.
- The trial court awarded Laura 70% of the community interest in both retirement plans when received and rendered a $10,000 money judgment payable over time to equalize the division.
- The trial court stated it considered the rights of the parties’ disabled adult son and James’s fault in breaking up the marriage in making an unequal division.

## Issues

1. Whether, under Texas Family Code § 3.63, a divorce court may consider one spouse’s ongoing responsibility to care for the parties’ physically disabled adult child when dividing community property.
2. Whether, in a fault-based divorce, the court may consider a spouse’s fault in breaking up the marriage as a factor supporting an unequal property division.
3. Whether § 3.63’s “just and right” standard, including “due regard for the rights of ... any children of the marriage,” is limited to minor children and excludes fault considerations.

## Decision

- The court of civil appeals reversed, holding § 3.63 did not permit consideration of either care of a disabled adult child or marital fault in dividing property.
- The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
- The Supreme Court held the trial court could consider Laura’s obligation to care for the physically disabled adult son in making a “just and right” division.
- The Supreme Court held the trial court could consider James’s fault in the breakup of the marriage in a fault-based divorce.
- Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Supreme Court upheld the 70% award of community interests in the retirement benefits and the $10,000 equalizing judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Texas Family Code § 3.63 gives divorce courts broad discretion to divide the community estate in a manner that is “just and right,” allowing consideration of multiple equitable factors.
- “Any children of the marriage” in § 3.63 may include an adult child whose serious disability results in dependency affecting the equities of the property division.
- In a fault-based divorce, marital fault may be weighed as one factor supporting a disproportionate but equitable division of community property.
- A property division will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion; a materially unequal distribution can be sustained when supported by evidence of disparate burdens and other equitable considerations.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas reinstated the trial court’s unequal property division, holding that the “just and right” standard permits consideration of both a spouse’s fault in the marital breakup and the other spouse’s continuing responsibility to care for the parties’ physically disabled adult child.


Young v. Young, 594 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), rev'd, 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980)