## Facts

- Derek L. Young and Joy G. Young divorced after nearly twenty-four years of marriage.
- Derek was a high-level executive with substantial compensation from multiple sources; in the five years before the divorce his annual income rose from about $1.5 million to roughly $7.7–$8 million.
- Joy was a stay-at-home parent and had not worked outside the home for about twenty years.
- The parties lived at a very high standard of living during the marriage, funded largely by Derek’s income, which the trial judge found was “on an upward trajectory.”
- In the Probate and Family Court, the judge concluded Joy could maintain a standard of living “consistent with the marital lifestyle” only if alimony rose as Derek’s income rose after the divorce.
- Because Derek’s compensation beyond salary and bonus was variable, the judge awarded general term alimony as 33% of Derek’s gross income, rather than a fixed dollar amount, so the payment would increase automatically with future income.
- Derek appealed the alimony award. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own motion.

## Issues

1. Under G.L. c. 208, § 34 and the Alimony Reform Act, when the payor has the ability to pay, is the recipient’s “need” measured by the marital standard of living at the time of separation or by the higher standard of living the recipient would likely have enjoyed in the future if the marriage had continued?
2. May a Probate and Family Court judge award general term alimony as a fixed percentage of the payor’s future gross income (here, 33%) based on variable compensation, rather than ordering a fixed amount?

## Decision

- The SJC held that, where the supporting spouse has the ability to pay, the recipient spouse’s “need” for purposes of general term alimony is limited to what is required to maintain the standard of living actually enjoyed at the time of the separation that led to divorce—not a projected, increasing standard of living the recipient would have had if the marriage continued.
- The SJC held that while there may be circumstances in which a percentage-of-income general term alimony award is “reasonable and fair,” the circumstances here did not justify an award of 33% of Derek’s gross income that would automatically rise with future income.
- The SJC vacated the alimony judgment in part and remanded to the Probate and Family Court to reevaluate alimony and enter a new judgment consistent with the SJC’s interpretation of “need” and its limits on percentage-based awards.

## Legal Principles

- In Massachusetts general term alimony, “need” is tied to the marital lifestyle at the time of the separation leading to divorce, even when the payor has substantial ability to pay.
- A court may not set general term alimony on the theory that the recipient should share in indefinite post-divorce increases in the payor’s income to mirror a hypothetical future marital lifestyle.
- Ability to pay does not expand the definition of “need”; ability to pay matters only after the court identifies a lawful measure of need.
- Percentage-of-income general term alimony orders can operate as automatic, self-adjusting modifications; such mechanisms require justification and are not the default approach.
- In high-income cases with variable compensation, the court must still craft an award that corresponds to the recipient’s established need at separation, rather than using a percentage formula that risks exceeding that need as income rises.

## Conclusion

Young v. Young holds that Massachusetts general term alimony is aimed at maintaining the recipient’s standard of living at the time of separation, not a future, increasing lifestyle that might have occurred absent divorce, and that a percentage-of-income award that automatically grows with the payor’s earnings is permissible only in unusual situations; because the 33% formula here improperly tracked future income growth and could exceed lawful “need,” the SJC vacated the alimony award in part and remanded for a recalculated, need-based judgment.


Young v. Young, 81 N.E.3d 1165, 478 Mass. 1 (2017)