## Facts

- The Secretary of the Interior issued a Record of Decision withdrawing roughly one million acres of federal land near the Grand Canyon from new mining location and entry for 20 years.
- The withdrawal was made under § 204 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), which authorizes administrative withdrawals and sets procedures for large withdrawals.
- Multiple plaintiffs, including individuals and mining-related trade associations, filed consolidated actions challenging the withdrawal.
- Plaintiffs argued that FLPMA § 204(c) contains a “legislative veto” allowing Congress to nullify large withdrawals by concurrent resolution without presentment to the President.
- Plaintiffs contended that, under separation-of-powers doctrine, the legislative veto is unconstitutional and not severable, requiring invalidation of the Secretary’s authority for large withdrawals and thus invalidation of the Grand Canyon withdrawal.
- The government argued plaintiffs lacked standing to litigate the separation-of-powers issue and, alternatively, that any unconstitutional veto provision was severable and did not defeat the withdrawal.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs had Article III standing and presented a justiciable controversy to challenge FLPMA § 204(c)’s legislative veto where Congress did not exercise the veto.
2. Whether FLPMA § 204(c)’s legislative veto (concurrent-resolution disapproval without presentment) violates constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
3. If unconstitutional, whether the legislative veto is severable from the remainder of FLPMA § 204(c), preserving the Secretary’s authority to make large withdrawals.
4. Whether the Grand Canyon withdrawal was invalid solely because § 204(c) contained an unconstitutional, allegedly nonseverable legislative veto.

## Decision

- The court proceeded to the merits and treated the challenge as justiciable in light of plaintiffs’ claimed concrete injury from the withdrawal.
- The court held FLPMA § 204(c)’s legislative veto unconstitutional under separation-of-powers principles recognized in INS v. Chadha.
- The court held the unconstitutional veto provision severable from the remainder of § 204(c).
- The court rejected the request to set aside the Grand Canyon withdrawal on the theory that the Secretary’s large-withdrawal authority was voided by the unconstitutional veto.
- Summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part consistent with these rulings; other statutory and NEPA claims were left for separate resolution.

## Legal Principles

- A statute permitting Congress to overturn a particular exercise of delegated executive authority through a concurrent resolution, without presentment to the President, violates the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements (INS v. Chadha).
- Severability turns primarily on congressional intent: an unconstitutional provision is severed when Congress would have enacted the remaining statutory scheme without the invalid part.
- In a delegation framework, invalidation of a legislative veto does not automatically invalidate the underlying executive delegation; the delegation remains effective if the veto is severable.
- Where the executive action is authorized by the valid remainder of the statute, the existence of an unconstitutional but severable legislative veto does not, by itself, nullify the executive action.

## Conclusion

The court invalidated FLPMA § 204(c)’s legislative veto but severed it from the statute, preserving the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to withdraw large tracts of land and leaving the Grand Canyon mining withdrawal in place against the constitutional/severability challenge.


Yount v. Salazar, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Ariz. 2013)