## Facts

- An individual was harmed by a false online posting created by an unknown third party and sought to hold a broadcaster liable for disseminating related information.
- The plaintiff alleged that the broadcaster’s conduct amounted to actionable defamation and related torts based on publication or republication of the third-party content.
- The defendant argued that federal statutory immunity for interactive computer services and/or traditional defamation limits barred the claims.
- The trial court entered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether federal immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230 bars state-law claims seeking to treat a defendant as the publisher or speaker of third-party content.
2. Whether a broadcaster’s dissemination of information derived from third-party online content constitutes actionable republication under applicable defamation law.
3. Whether any asserted claims avoid § 230 by recasting publisher-based liability as negligence or other tort theories.

## Decision

- The court affirmed judgment for the defendant.
- The court held that § 230 preempts state-law claims that would impose liability for publishing or disseminating third-party content.
- The court rejected attempts to impose liability by labeling the theory as negligence or another tort when the duty alleged depended on publisher-like control over third-party speech.
- The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish an actionable basis for liability consistent with § 230 and governing defamation rules.

## Legal Principles

- 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) bars claims that would treat a provider or user of an interactive computer service as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider.
- Plaintiffs cannot avoid § 230 by recharacterizing publication-based liability as negligence, failure to warn, or similar tort theories when the alleged duty arises from decisions to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter third-party content.
- Absent an applicable exception, state-law defamation and related claims premised on republication of third-party online content are preempted to the extent they impose publisher or distributor liability inconsistent with § 230.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed dismissal because the plaintiff’s claims sought to impose liability for dissemination of third-party speech, which § 230 bars, and the asserted tort theories did not supply a viable non-publisher basis for recovery.


Zeran v. Diamond Broad., Inc., 203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000)