## Facts

- Eugene W. Zimmerman controlled multiple related motel and restaurant businesses operating in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania area under names featuring “Holiday,” including “Holiday East,” “Holiday West,” and later “Holiday Inn Town.”
- Holiday Inns of America, Inc. operated a nationally known motel system using “Holiday Inn,” supported by national advertising and an integrated reservations network, and expanded into Pennsylvania beginning in 1958.
- Zimmerman claimed that Holiday Inns’ use of “Holiday Inn” in Pennsylvania caused confusion and diverted business from his “Holiday” motels, and sought an injunction barring Holiday Inns from using “Holiday Inn” within a broad region (including a large radius around Harrisburg and a corridor along the Pennsylvania Turnpike).
- Holiday Inns denied unfair competition and asserted equitable defenses, and counterclaimed to enjoin Zimmerman’s use of “Holiday Inn Town,” contending it traded on Holiday Inns’ reputation and created confusion.
- After an extensive equity trial, the chancellor found that “Holiday” had acquired a secondary meaning associated with Zimmerman only in the immediate Harrisburg area, granted limited injunctive relief against Holiday Inns in part of that area, and dismissed Holiday Inns’ counterclaim.
- Both sides appealed; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the equity record and entered final relief.

## Issues

1. Whether “Holiday,” as used for motel services, had acquired a secondary meaning identifying Zimmerman as the source in a relevant market such that Holiday Inns’ use of “Holiday Inn” constituted unfair competition there.
2. If secondary meaning existed, what geographic area (if any) justified injunctive protection for Zimmerman’s use of “Holiday.”
3. Whether Zimmerman’s use of “Holiday Inn Town” constituted intentional passing off or unfair competition warranting injunctive relief for Holiday Inns.

## Decision

- The court rejected Zimmerman’s request for broad territorial protection but agreed that Zimmerman proved only a narrow, localized secondary meaning for “Holiday” in the immediate Harrisburg area.
- The court modified the decree to confine and clarify injunctive relief to the limited area where secondary meaning and likely confusion were supported by the evidence.
- The court affirmed dismissal of Holiday Inns’ counterclaim, finding insufficient proof that Zimmerman adopted “Holiday Inn Town” to pass off his motel as part of the Holiday Inns system.
- Disposition: decree modified and, as modified, affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- A common, descriptive, or highly suggestive business term is protectable in unfair-competition law only upon proof that the term has acquired secondary meaning—consumer association of the term with a single source.
- Secondary meaning is market-specific and geographically limited; protection extends only to the area where the plaintiff’s goodwill and public recognition are established by evidence.
- Injunctive relief must be tailored to the proven area of secondary meaning and likely confusion; courts will not confer a broad monopoly over an ordinary word absent strong proof of widespread source identification.
- A defendant seeking to enjoin a similar name must show facts supporting probable confusion and, where relevant, intentional or deliberate passing off; lack of such proof defeats injunctive relief.

## Conclusion

The court limited protection for Zimmerman’s use of “Holiday” to the narrow Harrisburg-area market where secondary meaning was proven, modified the injunction accordingly, and refused to enjoin Zimmerman’s “Holiday Inn Town” name absent sufficient evidence of deliberate passing off or actionable confusion.


Zimmerman v. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., 438 Pa. 528, 266 A.2d 87 (1970)