Facts
- Kody Brown and four women (Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan) lived together in Utah as a self-described plural family associated with the Apostolic United Brethren faith.
- Only Kody Brown and Meri Brown were legally married; Kody’s relationships with the other women were religious “spiritual marriages” without additional civil marriage licenses.
- Utah’s bigamy statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1), criminalized bigamy where a married person “marries or cohabits with another person,” and also reached an unmarried person who “purports to marry” or “cohabits with” a married person.
- After the family became publicly known through the television show Sister Wives, law enforcement opened an investigation for potential violations of the statute.
- The Browns filed a § 1983 action against Utah County Attorney Jeffrey R. Buhman in his official capacity, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
- The Browns asserted facial and as-applied challenges, arguing that the statute’s “cohabits with another person” language burdened their religious practice, lacked a sufficient justification under the Fourteenth Amendment, and was unconstitutionally vague.
- Buhman argued the statute was not used to prosecute mere consensual adult cohabitation and that the office generally did not prosecute religiously motivated cohabitation absent additional criminal conduct (such as abuse or fraud).
- The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the constitutional claims and on the proper construction of the statute.
Issues
- Whether the “or cohabits with another person” portion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101(1) violates the Free Exercise Clause because it is not neutral or generally applicable as applied to religiously motivated plural cohabitation.
- Whether the cohabitation provision fails review under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including whether it lacks a rational basis as a criminal prohibition on cohabitation.
- Whether the term “cohabits” (as used in the bigamy statute) is void for vagueness under due process because it fails to give fair notice and allows arbitrary enforcement.
- If the cohabitation language is unconstitutional, whether it can be severed and whether the remaining “marries” / “purports to marry” terms can be narrowly construed to avoid constitutional problems.
Decision
- The court granted in part the Browns’ motion for summary judgment and denied Buhman’s cross-motion.
- The court held the statutory phrase “or cohabits with another person” in § 76-7-101(1) was facially unconstitutional, concluding it violated the Free Exercise Clause and also failed rational basis review under the Due Process Clause.
- The court struck (severed) the “cohabits with another person” language from the statute.
- The court construed the remaining “marry” and “purports to marry” language narrowly so the statute would target entering into (or holding out) an additional purportedly valid civil marriage, rather than criminalizing religious-only unions or household cohabitation.
Legal Principles
- Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
- Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that is not neutral and not generally applicable, including as applied through selective enforcement, can trigger strict scrutiny under Employment Division v. Smith and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.
- Under strict scrutiny, the government must show a compelling interest and that the challenged restriction is narrowly tailored; broad criminalization of cohabitation tied to religious practice may fail if asserted harms can be addressed through narrower criminal laws.
- Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal prohibition must have at least a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest; a provision can be invalid if it is an irrational means to address the state’s asserted objectives.
- A criminal statute may be void for vagueness if it does not give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
- When a portion of a statute is unconstitutional, a court may sever the invalid language if the remaining text can function independently and reflects legislative intent.
- Courts may apply a narrowing construction to statutory terms when the text is reasonably susceptible to that reading and doing so avoids constitutional infirmity.
Conclusion
The district court ruled for the Browns in substantial part, declaring Utah’s bigamy statute unconstitutional to the extent it criminalized “cohabit[ing] with another person” and severing that language from § 76-7-101(1); the court then preserved the remainder of the statute by construing “marry” and “purports to marry” to reach only conduct involving an additional purportedly valid civil marriage, not religious plural relationships based on cohabitation alone.