## Facts

- William Charles Payton was convicted in California of capital murder with a special circumstance (murder in the course of rape) and proceeded to a penalty phase.
- The defense presented mitigating evidence that, during incarceration after arrest, Payton had undergone a sincere religious conversion, joined Bible study and prison ministry, and positively influenced other prisoners.
- The jury received California’s sentencing-factor instruction including factor (k): “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”
- In closing, the prosecutor incorrectly asserted that factor (k) did not permit consideration of post-crime events and repeatedly stated jurors had heard no mitigation.
- Despite that assertion, the prosecutor discussed the conversion evidence at length and argued it was outweighed by the crime and Payton’s prior violent acts, minimizing “the mitigating effect” of the conversion.
- After a defense objection, the trial court told jurors the prosecutor’s statements were “merely argument,” without expressly correcting the prosecutor’s interpretation of factor (k).
- The jury recommended death, and the court imposed a death sentence.
- On direct review, the California Supreme Court affirmed, concluding there was no reasonable likelihood the jury thought it had to disregard the mitigating evidence.
- Federal habeas proceedings ultimately led the Ninth Circuit (after AEDPA was deemed applicable) to grant relief, holding the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent regarding ambiguous sentencing instructions.

## Issues

1. Whether, under AEDPA’s deferential standard, the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by concluding there was no reasonable likelihood the jury understood factor (k) to preclude consideration of Payton’s post-crime religious conversion as mitigation.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the California Supreme Court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA.
- Applying the standard from *Boyde v. California*, the Court concluded the state court reasonably found no reasonable likelihood that jurors were prevented from considering constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.
- The Court emphasized the breadth of factor (k), the trial court’s instruction that counsel’s statements were argument, and the prosecutor’s own extensive discussion weighing the conversion evidence as mitigation.

## Legal Principles

- Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
- Under *Boyde v. California*, the question for challenged capital sentencing instructions is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction to prevent consideration of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.
- When assessing alleged ambiguity in sentencing instructions, courts evaluate the instruction in the context of the entire proceeding, including argument and other instructions.
- A prosecutor’s incorrect legal gloss does not itself establish a constitutional violation where the proceedings, taken as a whole, reasonably support the conclusion that jurors could consider the mitigating evidence.
- Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant relief merely because it would interpret the record differently; the state court’s application must be objectively unreasonable.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that, applying AEDPA deference, the California Supreme Court reasonably applied *Boyde* in determining there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood factor (k) to bar consideration of Payton’s post-crime religious conversion as mitigating evidence, requiring reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief.


Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005)