## Facts

- Teresa A. Hedlund hosted a party at her home where alcohol was consumed by guests, including minors, and party events were recorded on video.
- After the party ended, seven people rode in a small car with inadequate restraints; the driver had indicated he was highly intoxicated.
- The car struck a concrete pillar; the driver and five passengers died.
- Hedlund was the sole survivor and suffered serious injuries.
- The City of Auburn charged Hedlund in municipal court with, among other offenses, being an accomplice to DUI and reckless driving based on allegedly facilitating intoxicated driving.
- At the close of the City’s case, the municipal court dismissed the accomplice-to-DUI and accomplice-to-reckless-driving counts, ruling Hedlund was a victim of those crimes and therefore excluded from accomplice liability by RCW 9A.08.020.
- The dismissal was affirmed on appeal, and the City sought discretionary review in the Washington Supreme Court.

## Issues

1. Whether RCW 9A.08.020’s victim-exclusion provision bars prosecuting an injured passenger as an accomplice to DUI and reckless driving arising from the same driving conduct.
2. Whether a passenger’s alleged encouragement or facilitation of intoxicated driving prevents that passenger from being treated as a “victim” for purposes of RCW 9A.08.020.

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the accomplice-to-DUI and accomplice-to-reckless-driving charges.
- The court held the plain language of RCW 9A.08.020 provides that a person is not an accomplice to a crime if the person is a victim of that crime.
- Hedlund, as an injured passenger harmed by the impaired/reckless driving, was a victim of those offenses and therefore could not be prosecuted as an accomplice to them.
- The court acknowledged policy concerns and Hedlund’s allegedly culpable conduct but concluded any narrowing of the statutory victim exclusion must come from the legislature.

## Legal Principles

- Under RCW 9A.08.020, a person is not an accomplice to a crime committed by another if the person is a victim of that crime.
- Courts apply the victim-exclusion provision according to statutory text; asserted legislative purpose or perceived unfairness does not justify judicially limiting the exclusion where the language is clear.
- A person’s morally blameworthy or contributory conduct may be punishable under other laws, but it does not override the statutory bar on accomplice liability when the person qualifies as a victim of the charged offense.

## Conclusion

Because RCW 9A.08.020 categorically excludes victims from accomplice liability and Hedlund was a victim of the DUI and reckless driving that injured her, the City could not prosecute her as an accomplice to those crimes.


City of Auburn v. Hedlund, 165 Wash. 2d 645, 201 P.3d 315 (Wash. 2009)