Facts
- Teresa A. Hedlund hosted a party at her home where alcohol was consumed by guests, including minors, and party events were recorded on video.
- After the party ended, seven people rode in a small car with inadequate restraints; the driver had indicated he was highly intoxicated.
- The car struck a concrete pillar; the driver and five passengers died.
- Hedlund was the sole survivor and suffered serious injuries.
- The City of Auburn charged Hedlund in municipal court with, among other offenses, being an accomplice to DUI and reckless driving based on allegedly facilitating intoxicated driving.
- At the close of the City’s case, the municipal court dismissed the accomplice-to-DUI and accomplice-to-reckless-driving counts, ruling Hedlund was a victim of those crimes and therefore excluded from accomplice liability by RCW 9A.08.020.
- The dismissal was affirmed on appeal, and the City sought discretionary review in the Washington Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether RCW 9A.08.020’s victim-exclusion provision bars prosecuting an injured passenger as an accomplice to DUI and reckless driving arising from the same driving conduct.
- Whether a passenger’s alleged encouragement or facilitation of intoxicated driving prevents that passenger from being treated as a “victim” for purposes of RCW 9A.08.020.
Decision
- The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the accomplice-to-DUI and accomplice-to-reckless-driving charges.
- The court held the plain language of RCW 9A.08.020 provides that a person is not an accomplice to a crime if the person is a victim of that crime.
- Hedlund, as an injured passenger harmed by the impaired/reckless driving, was a victim of those offenses and therefore could not be prosecuted as an accomplice to them.
- The court acknowledged policy concerns and Hedlund’s allegedly culpable conduct but concluded any narrowing of the statutory victim exclusion must come from the legislature.
Legal Principles
- Under RCW 9A.08.020, a person is not an accomplice to a crime committed by another if the person is a victim of that crime.
- Courts apply the victim-exclusion provision according to statutory text; asserted legislative purpose or perceived unfairness does not justify judicially limiting the exclusion where the language is clear.
- A person’s morally blameworthy or contributory conduct may be punishable under other laws, but it does not override the statutory bar on accomplice liability when the person qualifies as a victim of the charged offense.
Conclusion
Because RCW 9A.08.020 categorically excludes victims from accomplice liability and Hedlund was a victim of the DUI and reckless driving that injured her, the City could not prosecute her as an accomplice to those crimes.