Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 323 N.E.2d 876 (Mass. 1975)

Facts

  • Clark-Aiken owned or occupied property that was allegedly damaged by flooding.
  • Cromwell-Wright owned a dam and reservoir uphill from Clark-Aiken’s property.
  • Clark-Aiken sued in tort alleging that water stored behind the dam escaped or was released and flowed onto its property, causing damage.
  • The complaint asserted two theories: negligence (Count I) and strict liability without fault (Count II), relying on Rylands v. Fletcher and “non-natural” use of land.
  • The Superior Court sustained a demurrer to Count II on the ground that Massachusetts required intentional or negligent fault for liability from escaped water.
  • The case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court on the question whether Count II stated a recognized cause of action; Count I remained pending.

Issues

  1. Whether Massachusetts law recognizes a strict liability cause of action, independent of negligence, for damage caused by the escape of water impounded behind a dam or in a reservoir.
  2. Whether a pleading alleging escape of impounded water from a “non-natural” or extraordinary land use states a legally sufficient claim without alleging fault.

Decision

  • The Supreme Judicial Court answered the reported question in the plaintiff’s favor.
  • The court held that strict liability as articulated in Rylands v. Fletcher is part of Massachusetts common law.
  • Count II, which pleaded strict liability for damage caused by the escape of impounded water, stated a cognizable cause of action.
  • The demurrer to Count II was improperly sustained, and the case was to proceed consistent with the recognition of strict liability.
  • Massachusetts recognizes strict (absolute) liability, without proof of negligence, for harm caused by the escape of a dangerous accumulation brought onto land for the defendant’s purposes when the use is non-natural or extraordinary.
  • The doctrine applies in a limited class of cases involving special, unusual, or extraordinary uses of land that impose atypical risks on others if the substance escapes.
  • The strict liability rule is subject to traditional limitations and defenses commonly associated with Rylands-type liability (including exceptions tied to natural use and intervening causes).
  • Negligence remains the general basis of tort liability; strict liability is reserved for narrowly defined risk-intensive activities.

Conclusion

The court held that Massachusetts common law includes Rylands v. Fletcher strict liability for damage caused by escape of impounded water from a non-natural or extraordinary land use, so a complaint may state such a claim without alleging negligence or intentional fault.