Facts
- George Coffman worked as a naval electrician at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard from 1951 to 1969 and was exposed to asbestos in shipboard work areas.
- He encountered asbestos-containing insulation and related products manufactured or supplied by Keene Corporation and other defendants.
- Coffman developed an asbestos-related disease and alleged the occupational exposure caused his injuries.
- He pursued a strict-products-liability failure-to-warn theory, alleging the asbestos products were defective because they lacked adequate health-risk warnings.
- Keene contested proximate cause, arguing there was no proof Coffman would have followed any warning and therefore no proof that the absence of warnings contributed to his injuries.
- Coffman’s wife asserted a related loss-of-consortium claim.
Issues
- Whether, in a strict-liability failure-to-warn action, a court should recognize a rebuttable presumption that an adequate warning would have been read and heeded.
- Whether that presumption, if unrebutted, may constitute proof that the failure to warn was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
- Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the heeding presumption and the resulting allocation of the burden of producing evidence on causation.
Decision
- The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Coffman.
- The court held that New Jersey recognizes a rebuttable heeding presumption in strict-liability failure-to-warn cases: if an adequate warning had been provided, the plaintiff would have heeded it.
- The court held that, when unrebutted, the presumption may satisfy the causation element by supporting a finding that the lack of warning contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.
- The court concluded the jury instruction permitting the presumption was proper and that Keene did not present sufficient evidence to rebut it.
Legal Principles
- In strict-liability failure-to-warn cases, once a plaintiff establishes that a product lacked an adequate warning, the law applies a rebuttable presumption that an adequate warning would have been followed.
- The heeding presumption operates within the causation analysis and shifts to the defendant the burden of producing evidence that an adequate warning would not have been heeded or would not have changed the outcome.
- A defendant may rebut the presumption with evidence that the plaintiff already knew the risk, would have ignored warnings, or could not have avoided the exposure even if warned.
- If the defendant rebuts the presumption, the plaintiff must then offer affirmative proof that an adequate warning would have altered the plaintiff’s conduct and avoided or reduced the injury.
Conclusion
The court upheld the plaintiff’s verdict and adopted a rebuttable heeding presumption for strict-liability failure-to-warn claims, allowing causation to be established through the presumption unless the defendant produces evidence showing an adequate warning would not have changed the plaintiff’s actions or the injury outcome.