## Facts

- Boston police executed a search warrant at an apartment at 35 Revere Street on December 14, 1966; the warrant identified Jimmy Boyer Banks as the occupant and tenant.
- Banks opened the door and officers entered; one officer went into the kitchen.
- William G. Buckley was seated at a kitchen table on which officers observed a brown envelope and a partly smoked, unlighted cigarette; later testing showed both contained marijuana.
- Buckley was arrested and stated he had arrived a few minutes before police arrived.
- Banks and Buckley were the only persons in the apartment.
- Buckley was indicted under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 213A for being present where a narcotic drug was illegally kept or deposited.

## Issues

1. Whether § 213A is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process if it criminalizes mere physical presence without requiring knowledge or intent.
2. Whether punishment under § 213A for “mere presence” constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to deny Buckley’s motion for a directed verdict under a constitutionally valid construction of § 213A.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court overruled Buckley’s exceptions and affirmed.
- The court construed § 213A to require that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily be present where narcotics are illegally kept or deposited, rather than imposing liability for accidental or unaware presence.
- As so construed, § 213A was not void for vagueness and did not violate due process.
- The court rejected the cruel and unusual punishment claim.
- The evidence (Buckley’s proximity to marijuana in plain view, his contemporaneous presence, and the limited occupants) permitted a jury to infer the required knowledge and voluntariness; denial of a directed verdict was proper.

## Legal Principles

- Courts, where reasonably possible, construe criminal statutes to avoid serious constitutional doubts, including vagueness and arbitrary punishment.
- Absent clear and unambiguous legislative language creating strict liability, a criminal statute may be read to include an implied mens rea requirement.
- Under § 213A, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant knowingly and voluntarily was present at a place where narcotics were illegally kept or deposited; mere presence or association is insufficient.
- Punishment authorized for knowing participation in narcotics-related premises, as so limited, is not unconstitutional solely because it is substantial.

## Conclusion

The court preserved the drug “presence” statute by limiting it to knowing, voluntary presence at a location where narcotics are illegally kept, rejected constitutional challenges based on vagueness and cruel and unusual punishment, and held that the circumstances allowed the jury to find the implied mental element beyond a reasonable doubt.


Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 238 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1968)