## Facts

- Michael L. Crawford shot and killed Kimberly Noblin with a single gunshot to the face.
- Noblin was at least seven months pregnant with Crawford’s child.
- A medical examiner testified the fetus was viable and died from oxygen deprivation following Noblin’s death.
- A jury convicted Crawford of involuntary manslaughter for Noblin’s death and involuntary manslaughter for the death of her viable fetus.
- The trial judge instructed that a fetus is viable if it is “potentially able of living outside the mother’s womb, notwithstanding artificial aid.”
- The judge imposed consecutive sentences for the two involuntary manslaughter convictions.
- After affirmance on direct appeal, Crawford sought postconviction relief challenging consecutive sentences and, later, the viability standard and related jury instructions; both postconviction motions were denied.

## Issues

1. Whether consecutive sentences for involuntary manslaughter of the mother and involuntary manslaughter of her viable fetus, arising from a single act, violate state or federal double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments for the same offense.
2. Whether challenges raised in a second postconviction motion (vagueness of “viability,” alleged instructional error, and lack of proof of defendant’s knowledge of the fetus or viability) were waived because they could have been raised earlier.
3. Whether due process requires the Commonwealth to prove the defendant knew of the fetus’s existence or viability to convict him of involuntary manslaughter of a viable fetus.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denials of postconviction relief and left the convictions and consecutive sentences intact.
- Consecutive sentences did not violate double jeopardy because each death was a separate offense with a separate victim; the unit of prosecution in multi-victim violence is each person killed.
- The viability- and instruction-related claims raised in the second postconviction motion were waived because they were available on direct appeal or in earlier postconviction proceedings, and no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice warranted review.
- In the alternative, the court concluded that “viability” was sufficiently defined in Massachusetts common law to defeat a vagueness challenge and that the given viability instruction did not unconstitutionally reduce the Commonwealth’s burden.
- The court also concluded that conviction for involuntary manslaughter of a viable fetus does not require proof that the defendant knew of the fetus’s existence or viability.

## Legal Principles

- For violence resulting in multiple deaths, Massachusetts permits separate convictions and multiple punishments because the unit of prosecution is each victim, not the single act causing harm.
- Under Massachusetts common law, a viable fetus may be treated as a separate victim for homicide offenses.
- “Viability,” defined as potential ability to live outside the womb (including with artificial aid), is sufficiently definite to provide notice and constrain enforcement for due process purposes.
- Involuntary manslaughter focuses on wanton or reckless conduct; for the death of a viable fetus, the Commonwealth need not prove the defendant’s knowledge of the fetus or its viability.
- Claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in an earlier new-trial motion are generally waived in later postconviction proceedings absent a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

## Conclusion

The court held that the unlawful killing of a pregnant woman and her viable fetus constitutes two homicides against two victims, permitting separate convictions and consecutive sentences; it further enforced procedural waiver rules and rejected constitutional attacks on the viability standard and any requirement of the defendant’s knowledge of fetal viability for involuntary manslaughter.


Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683 (2000)