## Facts

- John Koczwara held a restaurant liquor license and operated J.K.’s Tavern in Scranton, Pennsylvania.
- On two dates in February 1958, minors frequented the tavern without a parent or guardian, and beer was sold to minors.
- The prosecution’s evidence attributed the minors’ presence and the sales to the tavern’s employees, not to Koczwara personally.
- There was no proof that Koczwara was present during the violations or that he personally participated in, authorized, or knew of the misconduct.
- The trial court removed a count alleging Koczwara personally sold beer to minors due to lack of evidence of personal involvement.
- A jury convicted Koczwara of permitting minors to frequent the premises and permitting beer to be sold to minors.
- The trial court imposed a $500 fine, costs, and a three-month jail sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether a liquor licensee may be held criminally liable, without proof of personal knowledge or participation, for Liquor Code violations committed by employees.
2. Whether due process permits imprisonment when the licensee’s liability is purely vicarious and unconnected to personal fault.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the convictions and the monetary penalties.
- The court held the Liquor Code may impose vicarious criminal liability on a licensee for employees’ regulatory violations, even without proof of the licensee’s knowledge or presence.
- The court vacated the three-month jail sentence, ruling imprisonment could not be imposed absent personal misconduct or culpability.
- The judgment of sentence was modified: fine and costs affirmed; incarceration set aside.

## Legal Principles

- Regulatory “public welfare” offenses may dispense with traditional mens rea requirements to secure effective enforcement of social and economic regulations.
- In liquor regulation, the legislature may place strict supervisory responsibility on a licensee as a condition of holding and using a license, allowing conviction and fines based on employees’ acts.
- A constitutional limit applies to punishment for vicarious regulatory offenses: deprivation of liberty (imprisonment) requires personal fault, not mere status as an employer or licensee.

## Conclusion

A liquor licensee may be vicariously convicted and fined for employees’ Liquor Code violations without proof of personal knowledge or participation, but imprisonment cannot be imposed on a purely vicarious basis where the licensee lacks personal culpability.


Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (Pa. 1959)