Facts
- David and Ginger Twitchell were Christian Scientists and the parents of a two-and-a-half-year-old child, Robyn.
- Robyn became ill over five days and died on April 8, 1986, from peritonitis caused by a perforated bowel associated with Meckel’s diverticulum.
- Evidence indicated the condition was medically treatable, including by surgery with a high success rate.
- During the illness, the parents obtained spiritual treatment through a Christian Science practitioner and nurse and consulted a church official about legal rights.
- After that consultation, David Twitchell read church literature quoting language from G.L. c. 273, § 1 suggesting that “remedial treatment by spiritual means alone” could satisfy parental obligations under Massachusetts law; the literature was based on an Attorney General opinion.
Issues
- Whether parents have a common-law duty to obtain necessary medical care for a child, such that failure to do so can constitute wanton or reckless conduct supporting involuntary manslaughter.
- Whether the “spiritual treatment” language in G.L. c. 273, § 1 bars involuntary manslaughter liability for parents who rely solely on spiritual treatment.
- Whether due process permits a mistake-of-law defense when defendants reasonably rely on an official but mistaken or misleading interpretation of law issued by the government official charged with enforcing the law.
- Whether excluding the reliance-based defense theory from evidence and jury instructions created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Decision
- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the involuntary manslaughter convictions and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that parents have a common-law duty to seek medical care for a child in circumstances like Robyn’s, and breach of that duty may constitute wanton or reckless conduct supporting involuntary manslaughter.
- The court held that G.L. c. 273, § 1’s spiritual-treatment provision does not immunize parents from involuntary manslaughter liability.
- The court held that a mistake-of-law defense may be available where defendants reasonably relied on a mistaken or misleading interpretation of law from the government official charged with enforcing the law.
- The court concluded the trial judge’s refusal to allow the jury to consider the reliance-based defense theory created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Legal Principles
- Parents have a common-law duty to obtain necessary medical treatment for their children; failure to act can satisfy the wanton-or-reckless element of involuntary manslaughter when the risk of death or serious harm is or should be apparent.
- Statutory language excusing “spiritual treatment” for purposes of a child-neglect statute does not bar prosecution for involuntary manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct causing death.
- Although mistake of law is generally not a defense, due process may require a limited exception when a defendant reasonably relies on an official, erroneous interpretation of law from the public authority responsible for enforcing or administering that law.
- When a properly supported reliance-based defense is kept from the jury by exclusion of evidence or by refusal to instruct, a new trial may be required if the omission creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
Conclusion
The court reaffirmed that religiously motivated refusal to seek medical care can support involuntary manslaughter when the refusal is wanton or reckless, but it ordered a new trial because the jury was not permitted to consider whether the defendants reasonably relied on an Attorney General–issued interpretation suggesting their conduct was lawful.