## Facts

- Barnett Welansky owned and operated the Cocoanut Grove nightclub in Boston and invited the public onto the premises as business visitors.
- On November 28, 1942, a fire rapidly spread through the nightclub, killing nearly 500 people.
- The club consisted of multiple rooms, narrow passageways, and egress routes that were insufficient for the crowd present.
- Exits were inadequately located or marked, with some known mainly to employees.
- Certain exits were obstructed by fixtures and furniture; at least one door was kept locked to prevent patrons from leaving without paying.
- The premises were overcrowded, and interior decorations included highly flammable materials.
- The fire began when an employee struck a match to see in a dark area; the flame ignited an artificial palm tree and nearby decorations.
- Welansky had been away from the club for about twelve days due to hospitalization, but evidence indicated he established and controlled the operating “system” and knew it would continue during his absence.
- The Commonwealth alleged Welansky, by wanton or reckless failure to fulfill his duty to keep the premises reasonably safe, caused patrons’ deaths.

## Issues

1. Whether indictments using the statutory “manslaughter” form, together with the Commonwealth’s specifications, provided constitutionally sufficient notice of the charges.
2. Whether the evidence permitted a finding that Welansky’s omissions, in breach of his duty to patrons, were wanton or reckless and a legal cause of death.
3. Whether conviction required proof that Welansky wantonly or recklessly caused the fire’s ignition, rather than proof that deaths resulted from wanton or reckless disregard of safety in the event of a fire from any cause.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions for involuntary manslaughter.
- The indictments were sufficient when read with the Commonwealth’s detailed specifications describing the alleged unsafe conditions.
- Wanton or reckless conduct can be based on an omission where the defendant has a duty of care, including a premises operator’s duty to business visitors.
- The Commonwealth was not required to prove Welansky caused the fire; it was enough that deaths resulted from his wanton or reckless disregard for patrons’ safety in the event of fire from any cause.
- Evidence of overcrowding, obstructed or locked exits, flammable decorations, and ongoing neglect of fire safety supported the jury’s finding of wanton or reckless conduct, notwithstanding Welansky’s physical absence shortly before the fire.

## Legal Principles

- Involuntary manslaughter in Massachusetts requires conduct beyond negligence and gross negligence, reaching wanton or reckless conduct.
- Wanton or reckless conduct involves an intentional act or intentional failure to act in the face of an obvious and substantial risk of serious harm.
- Where a defendant owes a legal duty of care (such as to business invitees on premises the defendant controls), an intentional failure to discharge that duty can constitute wanton or reckless conduct.
- Causation for manslaughter does not require that the defendant create the initiating hazard; liability may rest on maintaining conditions that foreseeably turn a hazard (including one created by others) into deadly harm.
- A defendant’s temporary absence does not preclude liability when the defendant established and maintained the operative safety “system” and knew it would continue.

## Conclusion

The court sustained involuntary manslaughter convictions against a nightclub operator whose duty-based omissions—overcrowding and obstructed or locked exits amid known fire risks—constituted wanton or reckless conduct, and whose liability did not depend on having caused the fire’s ignition.


Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. 1944)