## Facts

- Copeland drove an automobile on a public highway and came up behind two wagons traveling in the same direction.
- Copeland sounded his horn and attempted to pass the wagons.
- As Copeland was passing, a small boy ran from behind one of the wagons into the roadway in front of the car.
- Copeland’s car struck the boy, and the boy died from the collision.
- The evidence permitted competing inferences about Copeland’s driving: there was proof suggesting he operated at a moderate speed, on the correct side of the road, and gave warning, but there was also evidence from which negligence or recklessness could be found.
- Copeland was charged with involuntary manslaughter based on the death caused by the automobile.
- At trial, the court’s instructions did not clearly tell the jury that it could convict only if the death was proximately caused by Copeland’s violation of a statute regulating automobiles or by some negligent or reckless act, rather than by an accident occurring despite reasonable care.
- The jury found Copeland guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and Copeland appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether an involuntary manslaughter conviction may stand when the trial court fails to instruct the jury that it must find the death resulted from the defendant’s unlawful (statutory) violation or negligent/reckless driving, and not from an unavoidable accident caused by the child running from behind a wagon despite the defendant’s reasonable care.

## Decision

- Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the jury charge was erroneous because it did not require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death was caused by Copeland’s unlawful, negligent, or reckless operation of the automobile, as opposed to an unavoidable accident.
- The court explained that the child’s sudden act in running into the road was a circumstance the jury had to consider when deciding proximate cause and whether the event was unavoidable.

## Legal Principles

- Involuntary manslaughter based on the operation of an automobile requires proof that the death was proximately caused by the driver’s unlawful conduct (such as violating a statute regulating automobiles) or by negligent or reckless operation amounting to criminal fault; a conviction cannot rest on the mere fact that a death occurred in connection with driving.
- Criminal liability for an unintentional killing in this setting depends on whether the defendant’s unlawful, negligent, or reckless conduct was the proximate cause of death.
- The conduct of the deceased may be considered on the questions of proximate cause and whether the occurrence was an unavoidable accident, including where the evidence shows the deceased suddenly entered the vehicle’s path.
- If the evidence allows a finding that the defendant exercised due care and that the death occurred anyway (i.e., an unavoidable accident), the jury must be instructed that the defendant is not criminally responsible in that event.
- Jury instructions in vehicular manslaughter prosecutions must clearly separate criminally blameworthy conduct (unlawful or negligent/reckless driving causing death) from unavoidable accident, and must not permit conviction without the required causal and fault findings.

## Conclusion

The Tennessee Supreme Court set aside Copeland’s involuntary manslaughter conviction because the trial court’s instructions did not properly require the jury to find that the boy’s death was caused by Copeland’s unlawful, negligent, or reckless driving, and did not adequately present the alternative that the boy’s sudden dash from behind the wagon could have produced an unavoidable accident even if Copeland used reasonable care.


Copeland v. State, 285 S.W. 565 (1926)