## Facts

- Ronald Bartell was injured in a motorcycle accident and received hospital and medical treatment from Crouse-Irving Memorial Hospital, Inc. (Hospital).
- The Hospital billed Bartell and his mother, Yvonne Moore, for the treatment.
- Moore and Bartell sought medical assistance from the Onondaga County Department of Social Services (OCDSS) to pay the bill.
- OCDSS denied assistance because it found Moore had available resources, including life-insurance proceeds received after her husband’s death.
- Because the bills continued to accumulate, OCDSS agreed it would pay amounts exceeding Moore’s available assets once she spent those assets.
- Moore rejected the denial and demanded a fair hearing on eligibility.
- On the hearing date, OCDSS’s attorney had a Hospital statement indicating that approximately $8,985.63 of the bill had been paid and that only $169.50 remained.
- Relying on that statement, OCDSS’s attorney stated at the hearing that if Moore paid $169.50 from her own resources, OCDSS would pay the rest.
- Moore agreed, paid $169.50, and withdrew her fair-hearing request without any administrative ruling on eligibility.
- The Hospital later determined that the $8,985.63 had not been paid by Moore, Bartell, or anyone else; only the $169.50 had been paid.
- The Hospital sued Moore and Bartell to recover the unpaid balance.
- Moore and Bartell impleaded OCDSS and the New York State Department of Social Services (State DSS), claiming the agencies were bound by the hearing-day stipulation.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to the Hospital against Moore and Bartell and also granted judgment over in favor of Moore and Bartell against OCDSS and State DSS.
- OCDSS appealed from the judgment over.

## Issues

1. Whether OCDSS could be held liable for the Hospital bill based on its attorney’s hearing-day stipulation, where there was no administrative determination that Moore and Bartell were eligible for medical assistance under the Social Services Law.
2. Whether the stipulation was enforceable against OCDSS when it was made in reliance on a material factual mistake that most of the Hospital bill had already been paid.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division left undisturbed the Hospital’s recovery against Moore and Bartell.
- The Appellate Division reversed the judgment over against OCDSS.
- The court held that there had never been an administrative determination that Moore and Bartell were eligible for medical assistance or that OCDSS was responsible for their medical bills; the agency’s ineligibility determination remained in effect.
- The court refused to treat the hearing-day statement by the agency’s attorney as a binding settlement that could create payment responsibility for OCDSS in the absence of statutory eligibility and in light of the factual mistake about prior payment.

## Legal Principles

- Eligibility for medical assistance, and public responsibility for payment, are governed by the Social Services Law and require an administrative determination under the statutory standards.
- A county social services agency is not made responsible for a recipient’s medical bills by an informal or mistaken hearing-day stipulation when the agency’s prior determination of ineligibility remains unchanged.
- A stipulation offered in the context of an administrative fair hearing is not automatically equivalent to a settlement stipulation in a pending judicial action that supersedes prior obligations.
- Commitments involving public funds cannot be enforced where they conflict with the governing statutory eligibility scheme, particularly when based on a material mistake of fact about the existence of payments.

## Conclusion

The Appellate Division reversed the judgment over against OCDSS because Moore and Bartell’s claimed right to agency payment depended on a hearing-day stipulation made without any administrative ruling that they were eligible for medical assistance and made in reliance on an incorrect hospital statement that most of the bill had been paid; as a result, Moore and Bartell remained liable to the Hospital, and OCDSS was not required to reimburse them based on that stipulation.


Crouse-Irving Memorial Hospital v. Moore, 84 A.D.2d 954, 446 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1981)