## Facts

- Dean W. Crowther and his wife, Nellie Crowther, owned a parcel of Utah real property as joint tenants.
- Nellie wanted her son, Bryan D. Mower, to receive at least a one-half interest in the property.
- Nellie executed a quitclaim deed conveying her joint-tenancy interest in the parcel to Mower, and the deed was transmitted to Mower with instructions about recording.
- Mower was told to record the deed immediately if Nellie died before Dean.
- Nellie died on August 9, 1991.
- Mower recorded the quitclaim deed on August 15, 1991, several days after Nellie’s death.
- Dean filed a quiet title action, asserting that because Mower did not record the deed before Nellie died, the conveyance was ineffective and Dean took Nellie’s interest by the right of survivorship.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Dean, treated the deed as ineffective, and denied Mower’s motion for reconsideration.
- Mower appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Nellie Crowther’s execution and delivery of a quitclaim deed conveying her joint-tenancy interest to Mower severed the joint tenancy (and ended survivorship) before her death.
2. Whether Mower’s failure to record the deed before Nellie’s death made the conveyance invalid as between the parties or preserved Dean’s survivorship interest.
3. Whether the evidence created a genuine dispute about Nellie’s present intent to convey (including intent to deliver) despite instructions that the deed be recorded later.
4. Whether Dean could defeat the unrecorded (at the time) deed under Utah’s recording statutes as a protected subsequent purchaser for value.

## Decision

- The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment entered for Dean and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held that a bona fide conveyance by one joint tenant to a third party severs a joint tenancy and converts the ownership into a tenancy in common, without the other joint tenant’s consent.
- The court held that recordation is not a condition of a deed’s validity as between the parties (and others with notice), and recording after the grantor’s death did not invalidate Nellie’s earlier conveyance to Mower.
- The court concluded the documents and circumstances supported Nellie’s present intent to convey and deliver her interest to Mower, so the joint tenancy was severed during her lifetime.
- Because Nellie had transferred her interest before she died, she had no interest left at death for Dean to take by survivorship.
- The court further indicated that Dean was not protected by the recording act provisions applicable to good-faith purchasers for value who first record.

## Legal Principles

- A joint tenant may unilaterally terminate a joint tenancy by making a bona fide conveyance of the joint tenant’s interest to a third party; the conveyance severs the joint tenancy and creates a tenancy in common.
- The right of survivorship in a joint tenancy is an expectancy that ends upon severance; it does not remain after a valid inter vivos transfer by a joint tenant.
- A deed is effective upon valid execution and delivery with present intent to transfer; delivery and intent may be shown by the deed itself and related writings and circumstances.
- Under Utah law, recordation is not required for a deed to be valid as between the parties and persons with notice; delayed recordation does not by itself defeat the conveyance.
- Utah’s recording statutes principally protect subsequent purchasers for value who take in good faith and record first; a co-tenant asserting survivorship after an earlier conveyance by another joint tenant does not qualify as such a purchaser.

## Conclusion

In *Crowther v. Mower*, the Utah Court of Appeals held that Nellie Crowther’s delivered quitclaim deed conveying her joint-tenancy interest to her son severed the joint tenancy during her lifetime, so Dean Crowther could not take Nellie’s former interest by survivorship when she later died; the deed’s post-death recordation did not defeat its validity as between the parties, and the court therefore reversed the quiet-title summary judgment for Dean and remanded.


Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (1994)