Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

Facts

  • Wallace “Wally” Butts, former University of Georgia head football coach and then athletic director, was alleged to be a prominent sports figure.

  • The Saturday Evening Post, published by Curtis Publishing Co., ran an article alleging Butts conspired with Alabama coach Paul “Bear” Bryant to fix the 1962 Georgia–Alabama football game.

  • The story relied mainly on an affidavit from George Burnett, who claimed he accidentally overheard a telephone call between Butts and Bryant.

  • Butts denied the allegations and sued for libel in a federal diversity action seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

  • Evidence at trial supported that Curtis:

    • Knew Burnett was on criminal probation and published without independent corroboration.
    • Failed to review Burnett’s notes, interview an available corroborating witness, review game films, or check whether Alabama changed its plans.
    • Assigned the story to a writer lacking football expertise and did not have an expert review the reporting.
  • The jury awarded general and punitive damages (later reduced by remittitur).

  • After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Curtis sought a new trial; the trial court found the evidence supported reckless disregard for truth and denied relief; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

  • The Supreme Court reviewed the case together with Associated Press v. Walker.

Issues

  1. Whether the First Amendment defamation standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applies to a plaintiff who is a “public figure” but not a public official.
  2. If the standard applies, whether Curtis Publishing’s conduct met the constitutionally required showing of fault to sustain libel damages.

Decision

  • The Court affirmed the judgment for Butts.
  • A majority agreed that public figures, like public officials, must prove publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth to recover for defamation.
  • Applying that constitutional standard, the Court concluded Curtis’s publication practices reflected a reckless disregard for truth, supporting liability and the damages award.
  • Public figures may not recover for defamation absent proof equivalent to New York Times “actual malice”: knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether the statement was false.
  • A publisher’s “reckless disregard” may be shown by an extreme departure from responsible investigative and editorial practices, particularly where there is time to verify and no immediate deadline pressure.
  • Recklessness is supported where a publisher relies on a highly questionable source while failing to take readily available corroborative steps and publishing serious accusations without adequate checking.

Conclusion

The Court placed public figures within the First Amendment framework governing defamation claims by public officials and upheld a libel judgment where the publisher’s handling of a grave accusation reflected reckless disregard for truth demonstrated by major investigative omissions and substandard editorial practices.