Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wash. 2d 760 (2003)

Facts

  • Linda Eggleston owned and lived in a two-bedroom home with her adult son, Brian, in Tacoma, Washington.
  • Sheriff’s deputies investigated Brian for suspected drug dealing, conducted surveillance, and obtained a search warrant.
  • Deputies executed the warrant early in the morning; a gunfight occurred during entry, and an officer was killed.
  • Investigators later found drugs, cash, weapons, and drug paraphernalia in the home; Brian was arrested and prosecuted for multiple offenses, including homicide-related charges.
  • A later warrant authorized seizure of homicide-related evidence from the home, including trace evidence and blood-related items.
  • During execution of the later warrant and related crime-scene measures, officers removed two walls (including a load-bearing wall), leaving the structure unstable.
  • A court order then required the home to be preserved in its damaged condition as a crime scene, preventing repair and occupancy for an extended period.
  • Linda was never charged with any crime and was not shown to have participated in Brian’s alleged criminal conduct.
  • Linda filed an administrative claim for compensation, was denied, and then sued, alleging that the government actions amounted to a compensable taking under article I, section 16 of the Washington Constitution.
  • The trial court granted summary judgment for Pierce County; the state supreme court accepted direct review on the takings question.

Issues

  1. Whether damage and loss of use of a home caused by execution of criminal search warrants and a court-ordered crime-scene preservation order constitutes a compensable “taking” or “damaging” under article I, section 16 of the Washington Constitution.

Decision

  • The Washington Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for Pierce County.
  • The court held the challenged actions were a lawful exercise of police power in criminal investigation and prosecution, not an exercise of eminent domain.
  • The court concluded that the severe damage and loss of use were not a compensable “taking” or “damaging” under article I, section 16.
  • Article I, section 16 requires just compensation when private property is “taken or damaged” for public or private use, but not every government-caused loss qualifies.
  • Government action taken under the police power—such as executing criminal search warrants, seizing evidence, and preserving a crime scene—generally does not give rise to takings liability when the harm is incidental to reasonable law-enforcement activity.
  • A compensable taking typically involves appropriation or occupation for public use in the eminent-domain sense; temporary control and physical alteration for evidentiary purposes during criminal proceedings does not, by itself, constitute such an appropriation.
  • Washington’s broader “taken or damaged” language does not extend compensation to ordinary law-enforcement harms merely because they are substantial.

Conclusion

The court held that destruction and prolonged loss of use of a residence resulting from execution of criminal warrants and a crime-scene preservation order fell within police power and did not require compensation as a constitutional taking or damaging under article I, section 16.