Facts
- A church owned a 21-acre parcel in a canyon along Mill Creek and operated “Lutherglen,” a campground and retreat facility.
- The church built multiple structures on the property, including a dining hall, bunkhouses, a caretaker’s lodge, an outdoor chapel, and a footbridge.
- After a fire affected land above the canyon, flooding destroyed Lutherglen’s buildings.
- The County adopted an interim flood-protection ordinance designating an interim flood protection area and prohibiting construction or reconstruction of any building or structure within that area, including the church’s site.
- The church sued in California state court, alleging the ordinance denied all use of the property and seeking inverse-condemnation damages for the lost use.
- The trial court struck the “denial of all use” allegation and the damages claim, relying on a California rule limiting remedies for regulatory takings to nonmonetary relief.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed, assuming the complaint alleged a taking of all use but holding the remedy was limited to invalidation or similar nonmonetary relief; the state supreme court denied review.
Issues
- Whether the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause requires monetary compensation for the period a land-use regulation has already worked a taking of all use, even if the regulation is later invalidated or repealed.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
- The Court held that if a land-use regulation effects a taking by denying all use, the Just Compensation Clause requires a damages remedy for the time the regulation was in effect, even if the regulation is later withdrawn or invalidated.
- The Court directed that the struck allegations be reinstated so the church could pursue damages, while leaving to state courts whether a taking occurred on these facts and, if so, the proper measure of compensation.
Legal Principles
- The Just Compensation Clause requires compensation when government action has effected a taking; invalidation of the offending measure does not, by itself, satisfy the compensation requirement for the period of the taking.
- If government action has already caused a taking of all use, later repeal, amendment, or invalidation cannot eliminate the duty to pay compensation for the time the taking was effective.
- Temporary deprivations of all economically viable use can be compensable, and temporary regulatory takings are treated similarly to temporary physical invasions for remedial purposes.
- The decision addresses remedy, not the substantive standard for when a regulation constitutes a taking; whether a taking occurred remains a fact- and law-specific inquiry for the lower courts.
Conclusion
The Court held that when a land-use regulation is found to have denied all use of property, the Constitution requires monetary compensation for the period the restriction was in force, even if the regulation is later set aside, and it remanded for further proceedings on whether a taking occurred and, if so, the amount of just compensation.