Facts
- Tsui Yuan Tseng arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport to board an El Al international flight from New York to Tel Aviv.
- El Al security personnel interviewed her, deemed her “high risk,” and escorted her to a private room for a pre-boarding security search.
- She was instructed to remove certain clothing items and lower her jeans; a female guard conducted a physical search over her clothes and used an electronic wand.
- The search lasted about 15 minutes; El Al cleared her and allowed her to board.
- Tseng alleged emotional and psychosomatic injuries from the search and sought medical and psychiatric treatment, but alleged no “bodily injury.”
- Tseng sued under New York tort law (e.g., assault and false imprisonment). The case was removed to federal court.
- The district court dismissed, concluding the Warsaw Convention precluded state-law claims and, under controlling interpretation of Article 17, did not allow recovery for purely psychic injury.
- The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning the incident was not an “accident” under Article 17 and therefore was not “covered,” leaving state-law remedies available.
Issues
- Whether the Warsaw Convention precludes state-law tort claims for personal injuries occurring in the course of embarking on an international flight when the passenger cannot satisfy Article 17’s conditions for carrier liability (e.g., no “accident” and no “bodily injury”).
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.
- The Court held that when a passenger’s personal injury occurs on board or during embarking/disembarking in international carriage, the Warsaw Convention is exclusive.
- If Article 17 does not allow recovery for the episode, the passenger has no alternative remedy under state law for that injury.
- The Court accepted for purposes of decision that the search was not an Article 17 “accident” and did not involve “wilful misconduct,” and resolved only the Convention’s exclusivity.
Legal Principles
- The Warsaw Convention’s liability scheme for personal injury in international air transportation is exclusive within its substantive scope; state-law causes of action are preempted for injuries occurring on board or during embarking/disembarking.
- Article 24’s reference to “cases covered by article 17” is not limited to successful Article 17 claims; it reaches occurrences of the kind addressed by Article 17 even when Article 17 ultimately provides no recovery.
- Article 17 permits recovery only for “bodily injury” caused by an “accident” during covered phases of international carriage; purely mental or psychosomatic injuries are not compensable absent bodily injury.
- Later international developments (including Montreal Protocol No. 4) were treated as confirming that, within the Convention’s scope, the absence of a Convention remedy generally means no recourse to local law.
Conclusion
The Court held that for personal injuries alleged to have occurred during the operations of embarking on an international flight, the Warsaw Convention provides the only avenue for recovery; because Tseng’s alleged harms were not compensable under Article 17, her state-law tort claims were barred and she could not recover.