Facts
- Vera M. English worked as a laboratory technician at a federally licensed nuclear facility operated by General Electric Company (GE).
- English reported perceived nuclear-safety violations to GE management and federal authorities, including alleged failures to clean radioactive spills.
- To draw attention to contamination, English left a uranium-contaminated work table uncleaned, marked contaminated areas with red tape, and later notified her supervisor; work was halted for inspection and cleaning.
- GE disciplined English, charged her with knowingly failing to clean up radioactive contamination, reassigned her, and later terminated her.
- English filed an administrative retaliation complaint under § 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA); an ALJ found a violation, but the Secretary of Labor dismissed the complaint as untimely under the 30-day deadline in § 210(b)(1).
- English then brought a diversity action seeking damages, including a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The district court rejected field preemption but dismissed on conflict-preemption grounds; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
- Whether federal regulation of nuclear safety field-preempts a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on alleged retaliation against a nuclear-facility employee.
- Whether ERA § 210 conflict-preempts such a state tort claim because it allegedly interferes with the statute’s remedies, limitations period, or administrative enforcement scheme.
Decision
- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded.
- The Court held that English’s state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by federal law.
- The claim was not field-preempted because it did not regulate radiological safety; it targeted retaliatory conduct causing emotional harm.
- The claim was not conflict-preempted because any interference with ERA § 210’s remedial choices, filing deadline, or administrative process was insufficient and largely speculative.
Legal Principles
- Preemption is determined by congressional intent; absent express preemption, preemption may arise through field preemption or conflict preemption.
- Field preemption requires a clear and manifest intent to displace state law when the relevant area includes matters traditionally regulated by the states.
- A generally applicable state tort claim is not field-preempted merely because it arises in a federally regulated industry; the relevant question is whether the state rule functions as regulation of the federally occupied field.
- Conflict preemption applies only to the extent state law makes compliance with federal law impossible or stands as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives; speculative or hypothetical interference is inadequate.
- State causes of action are not ordinarily preempted solely because they authorize damages beyond those available under federal remedies, absent an actual conflict or clear congressional displacement.
Conclusion
The Court allowed a nuclear-facility employee’s state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed, holding that the ERA’s whistleblower provisions neither occupied the field of such employment-related tort claims nor created an actual conflict sufficient to preempt traditional state remedies.