## Facts

- Vera M. English worked as a laboratory technician at a federally licensed nuclear facility operated by General Electric Company (GE).
- English reported perceived nuclear-safety violations to GE management and federal authorities, including alleged failures to clean radioactive spills.
- To draw attention to contamination, English left a uranium-contaminated work table uncleaned, marked contaminated areas with red tape, and later notified her supervisor; work was halted for inspection and cleaning.
- GE disciplined English, charged her with knowingly failing to clean up radioactive contamination, reassigned her, and later terminated her.
- English filed an administrative retaliation complaint under § 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA); an ALJ found a violation, but the Secretary of Labor dismissed the complaint as untimely under the 30-day deadline in § 210(b)(1).
- English then brought a diversity action seeking damages, including a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The district court rejected field preemption but dismissed on conflict-preemption grounds; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether federal regulation of nuclear safety field-preempts a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on alleged retaliation against a nuclear-facility employee.
2. Whether ERA § 210 conflict-preempts such a state tort claim because it allegedly interferes with the statute’s remedies, limitations period, or administrative enforcement scheme.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded.
- The Court held that English’s state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by federal law.
- The claim was not field-preempted because it did not regulate radiological safety; it targeted retaliatory conduct causing emotional harm.
- The claim was not conflict-preempted because any interference with ERA § 210’s remedial choices, filing deadline, or administrative process was insufficient and largely speculative.

## Legal Principles

- Preemption is determined by congressional intent; absent express preemption, preemption may arise through field preemption or conflict preemption.
- Field preemption requires a clear and manifest intent to displace state law when the relevant area includes matters traditionally regulated by the states.
- A generally applicable state tort claim is not field-preempted merely because it arises in a federally regulated industry; the relevant question is whether the state rule functions as regulation of the federally occupied field.
- Conflict preemption applies only to the extent state law makes compliance with federal law impossible or stands as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives; speculative or hypothetical interference is inadequate.
- State causes of action are not ordinarily preempted solely because they authorize damages beyond those available under federal remedies, absent an actual conflict or clear congressional displacement.

## Conclusion

The Court allowed a nuclear-facility employee’s state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed, holding that the ERA’s whistleblower provisions neither occupied the field of such employment-related tort claims nor created an actual conflict sufficient to preempt traditional state remedies.


English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)