Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Loc. 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)

Facts

  • A union member and officer sued his carpenters’ local and union officials in California state court.
  • He alleged that, after disputes over internal union policies and his dissident intra-union political activity, union officials engaged in threats, intimidation, and other outrageous conduct intended to cause severe emotional distress, resulting in bodily injury (intentional infliction of emotional distress).
  • He also asserted claims tied to employment and contract rights, alleging discriminatory hiring-hall referrals and breaches of hiring-hall and membership-contract obligations.
  • The trial court dismissed the hiring-hall discrimination and contract-based counts as federally preempted, but allowed the emotional-distress claim to proceed; a jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages.
  • The California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the conduct was arguably within the National Labor Relations Board’s jurisdiction and therefore preempted.
  • The Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

  1. Whether the National Labor Relations Act preempts a state tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from union officials’ allegedly outrageous threats and intimidation in a labor-related setting.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal.
  • The Court held that the NLRA did not preempt the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under these circumstances.
  • The Court concluded that adjudicating the tort claim would not require the state court to decide questions committed to the NLRB and would not regulate conduct protected by federal labor law.
  • NLRA preemption is not automatic merely because conduct occurs in a labor context; courts assess whether the challenged conduct is protected or prohibited by the NLRA and whether state adjudication risks interference with federal labor policy.
  • No provision of the NLRA protects union conduct that is sufficiently outrageous—conduct that “no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure.”
  • States have a substantial interest in protecting residents from severe emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct, and that interest can justify allowing traditional tort remedies to proceed alongside federal labor regulation.
  • A state tort claim may proceed where it is collateral to labor-law questions and can be resolved without determining whether the underlying labor practices violate the NLRA.

Conclusion

The Court held that a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on union officials’ alleged threats and intimidation was not preempted by the NLRA, because the alleged outrageous conduct lacked federal protection and the state’s interest in redressing severe personal harm could be served without intruding on the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.