## Facts

- The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) treats expenditures made in cooperation or consultation with a candidate as “contributions” and limits certain party spending in Senate elections under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d).
- In earlier litigation, the Supreme Court held that § 441a(d) could not be applied to a political party’s truly independent expenditures, but left open a broader facial challenge to limits on coordinated party spending.
- On remand, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee brought a facial First Amendment challenge, arguing that FECA’s limits on party expenditures are unconstitutional even when the spending is coordinated with a candidate.
- The district court and a divided Tenth Circuit agreed with the Party and held the coordinated party expenditure limits facially unconstitutional.
- The Federal Election Commission sought Supreme Court review.

## Issues

1. Whether FECA’s limits on a political party’s coordinated expenditures with a federal candidate under § 441a(d) are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
2. Whether coordinated party expenditures should be analyzed as independent expenditures (subject to strict protection) or as contributions (subject to contribution-limit review).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Souter.
- The Court held that coordinated party expenditures may be treated as contributions and limited to prevent corruption and circumvention of individual contribution limits.
- Applying the “closely drawn” standard for contribution limits, the Court upheld § 441a(d) as facially constitutional as applied to coordinated party spending.
- The Court left in place the prior holding that limits on truly independent party expenditures are unconstitutional.

## Legal Principles

- Expenditures coordinated with a candidate are functionally equivalent to contributions and may be regulated under FECA’s contribution framework.
- Contribution-type limits are evaluated under “closely drawn” scrutiny: the restriction must be closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important governmental interest.
- Preventing quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of corruption, and preventing circumvention of contribution limits through conduits, are sufficiently important governmental interests.
- Congress may limit coordinated party spending to avoid rendering individual contribution limits ineffective, even if earmarking rules also address some conduit risks.
- The constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures does not justify limits on truly independent expenditures by political parties.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld FECA’s limits on coordinated party expenditures as facially constitutional because coordinated spending can operate like direct contributions and can be restricted, under closely drawn review, to prevent corruption and circumvention of contribution limits, while independent party expenditures remain protected from such limits.


Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001)