## Facts

- Glen R. Peterson, a lawyer representing plaintiffs in a civil jury trial, went to lunch with one of his expert witnesses during a recess.
- At a delicatessen, Peterson and the expert sat at a table already occupied by two jurors serving in the case.
- Peterson acknowledged he knew the two women at the table were jurors.
- Two secretaries from the defense law firm observed the interaction and reported it to defense counsel.
- Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on Peterson’s communication with jurors during the recess; the trial court granted the mistrial.
- Peterson apologized to the court and stipulated that he would reimburse the county for juror fees and mileage for two days of service.
- Before retrial, the defendant sought assessment of costs and attorney’s fees against Peterson or his clients; the trial court assessed them against Peterson alone, but that order was reversed on appeal for lack of authority to impose such costs on a nonparty attorney.
- The Florida Bar charged Peterson with violating DR 7-108(B)(1) of the Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility, prohibiting a lawyer from communicating with a juror during trial.

## Issues

1. Whether Peterson violated DR 7-108(B)(1) by knowingly communicating with sitting jurors during a recess in a trial he was trying.
2. What discipline was appropriate given that the content and extent of the communication were unclear and no improper intent was proven.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Florida approved the referee’s finding that Peterson violated DR 7-108(B)(1) by communicating with two jurors during trial.
- The court imposed a public reprimand.
- The court also imposed one year of probation, conditioned in part on successful completion of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE).

## Legal Principles

- A lawyer is prohibited from communicating with jurors during the course of a trial under DR 7-108(B)(1).
- Knowing contact with sitting jurors constitutes professional misconduct even if the communication’s subject matter is unclear or innocuous.
- Proof of intent to gain an unfair advantage is not required to establish a violation; lack of improper motive may mitigate the sanction but does not excuse the misconduct.
- Professional discipline is separate from civil cost-shifting remedies; the absence of authority to assess costs and fees against an attorney in the civil case does not bar bar discipline for the same conduct.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Florida disciplined an attorney who knowingly communicated with jurors during trial recess, holding that DR 7-108(B)(1) imposes a strict ban on juror contact during trial regardless of proven intent, and ordered a public reprimand with one year of probation conditioned in part on passing the MPRE.


Fla. Bar v. Peterson, 418 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1982)