## Facts

- Congress enacted Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), authorizing federal funds for educational services and materials provided to students, including students in religious and sectarian schools.
- Federal taxpayer-plaintiffs alleged that federal funds were being disbursed to support instruction and educational materials in religious schools.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that the expenditures were unauthorized or unconstitutional, and injunctive relief to stop further disbursements.
- A three-judge federal district court dismissed for lack of standing, relying on Frothingham v. Mellon’s general rule against federal taxpayer suits.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the standing dismissal and the propriety of convening a three-judge court.

## Issues

1. Whether the three-judge district court was properly convened.
2. Whether Article III categorically bars federal taxpayer standing to challenge federal taxing and spending programs.
3. Whether federal taxpayers had standing to challenge ESEA expenditures as violating the Establishment Clause.

## Decision

- The Court held the three-judge court was properly convened because the suit raised a substantial constitutional challenge to a federal spending scheme that, if invalidated, would affect the statutory program beyond a single locality.
- The Court rejected the view that Article III creates an absolute bar to federal taxpayer suits challenging federal taxing and spending measures.
- The Court held that these taxpayers had standing because they challenged a congressional exercise of the taxing and spending power alleged to violate a specific constitutional limitation: the Establishment Clause.
- The judgment dismissing for lack of standing was reversed and the case remanded for proceedings on the merits.

## Legal Principles

- Article III standing requires a sufficient personal stake to ensure concrete adverseness; taxpayer status alone usually is insufficient.
- Federal taxpayer standing exists in a narrow category when a plaintiff satisfies a two-prong nexus test:
  - The taxpayer must challenge an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power, not merely incidental expenditures connected to an essentially regulatory program.
  - The taxpayer must allege that the challenged spending exceeds a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power, not merely that it is ultra vires in a general sense.
- The Establishment Clause can qualify as a specific constitutional limitation for purposes of taxpayer standing when a plaintiff alleges compelled support of religion through congressional appropriations.

## Conclusion

Flast permitted a limited exception to the general prohibition on federal taxpayer suits by allowing federal taxpayers to challenge congressional expenditures under the taxing and spending power when the alleged violation is of a specific constitutional restriction, exemplified by the Establishment Clause.


Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)