Facts
- Florida law, § 790.33, preempted local regulation of firearms and ammunition and declared conflicting local measures “null and void”; in 2011, it added penalty provisions, including a private right of action for persons or organizations adversely affected by prohibited local measures “promulgated or caused to be enforced.”
- The City of Tallahassee had two firearms-discharge ordinances adopted before preemption; after preemption they were legally void but remained printed in the municipal code through later recodifications.
- Tallahassee did not enforce either ordinance after statewide preemption took effect.
- Florida Carry, Inc. and the Second Amendment Foundation sued seeking (1) declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the ordinances and compel repeal and (2) damages under § 790.33(3)(f), alleging the City’s continued republication was unlawful “promulgation.”
- The City and certain officials counterclaimed, asserting the 2011 penalty provisions were unconstitutional on legislative-immunity and free-speech grounds.
- The trial court entered summary judgment for the City on the § 790.33(3)(f) claim and dismissed the counterclaim as nonjusticiable; both sides appealed.
Issues
- Whether Tallahassee’s continued republication of preempted, void firearms ordinances in its municipal code constituted prohibited “promulgation” under § 790.33(3)(f), triggering liability under the statute’s penalty provisions.
- Whether the City’s constitutional challenge to the penalty provisions of § 790.33 presented a ripe, justiciable controversy.
Decision
- The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and officials.
- The court held that continued republication of already-void ordinances, without enactment of new firearms regulations or enforcement activity, was not “promulgation” within the meaning of § 790.33(3)(f).
- The court affirmed dismissal of the City’s counterclaim, concluding the constitutional challenge to the penalty provisions was not ripe and presented no justiciable controversy because no penalties had been imposed.
Legal Principles
- Florida’s firearms-preemption statute occupies the field of firearms and ammunition regulation; conflicting local ordinances are legally null and void.
- For § 790.33(3)(f), “promulgation” is tied to affirmative governmental action such as enacting or formally issuing a measure as operative law, not the passive continued printing of void text during routine code recodification.
- The penalty provisions function as a remedial/standing mechanism requiring a predicate statutory violation; absence of enactment or enforcement activity defeats liability under § 790.33(3)(f).
- A constitutional challenge to statutory penalties may be dismissed as nonjusticiable when no enforcement or penalties have occurred and the dispute is hypothetical.
Conclusion
The court ruled that Tallahassee’s mere retention and republication of preempted firearms ordinances in its municipal code did not amount to “promulgation” under § 790.33(3)(f) and thus did not trigger statutory penalties, and it declined to reach constitutional objections to the penalty provisions because the counterclaim was unripe.