Facts
- Congress enacted Titles I and II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), authorizing federal funds for educational services and materials provided to students, including students in religious and sectarian schools.
- Federal taxpayer-plaintiffs alleged that federal funds were being disbursed to support instruction and educational materials in religious schools.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that the expenditures were unauthorized or unconstitutional, and injunctive relief to stop further disbursements.
- A three-judge federal district court dismissed for lack of standing, relying on Frothingham v. Mellon’s general rule against federal taxpayer suits.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the standing dismissal and the propriety of convening a three-judge court.
Issues
- Whether the three-judge district court was properly convened.
- Whether Article III categorically bars federal taxpayer standing to challenge federal taxing and spending programs.
- Whether federal taxpayers had standing to challenge ESEA expenditures as violating the Establishment Clause.
Decision
- The Court held the three-judge court was properly convened because the suit raised a substantial constitutional challenge to a federal spending scheme that, if invalidated, would affect the statutory program beyond a single locality.
- The Court rejected the view that Article III creates an absolute bar to federal taxpayer suits challenging federal taxing and spending measures.
- The Court held that these taxpayers had standing because they challenged a congressional exercise of the taxing and spending power alleged to violate a specific constitutional limitation: the Establishment Clause.
- The judgment dismissing for lack of standing was reversed and the case remanded for proceedings on the merits.
Legal Principles
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Article III standing requires a sufficient personal stake to ensure concrete adverseness; taxpayer status alone usually is insufficient.
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Federal taxpayer standing exists in a narrow category when a plaintiff satisfies a two-prong nexus test:
- The taxpayer must challenge an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power, not merely incidental expenditures connected to an essentially regulatory program.
- The taxpayer must allege that the challenged spending exceeds a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power, not merely that it is ultra vires in a general sense.
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The Establishment Clause can qualify as a specific constitutional limitation for purposes of taxpayer standing when a plaintiff alleges compelled support of religion through congressional appropriations.
Conclusion
Flast permitted a limited exception to the general prohibition on federal taxpayer suits by allowing federal taxpayers to challenge congressional expenditures under the taxing and spending power when the alleged violation is of a specific constitutional restriction, exemplified by the Establishment Clause.