Foster v. Dilger, Civil Action No. 3:10-41 (2010)

Facts

  • Kentucky law, KRS § 121.150(6), limited an individual’s direct contributions to a candidate for local school-board office to $100 and provided for criminal penalties for violations.
  • Benjamin Foster sued to challenge the constitutionality of the $100 limit, alleging it restricted his First Amendment rights of political expression and association.
  • Foster named as defendants Craig Dilger, chairman of the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, and the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance (the registry).
  • Foster alleged that the low $100 limit constrained meaningful support for school-board candidates and, in turn, limited candidates’ ability to run effective campaigns funded through direct contributions.
  • Foster asserted that independent expenditures in school-board elections could be substantial, making the low direct-contribution cap especially burdensome for candidates attempting to finance campaign activity through lawful, direct donations.
  • Foster sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of KRS § 121.150(6) while the case was litigated.

Issues

  1. Whether Foster was entitled to a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of KRS § 121.150(6)’s $100 individual contribution limit to school-board candidates based on his First Amendment challenge.

Decision

  • The court denied Foster’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
  • The court treated continued operation and enforcement of KRS § 121.150(6) as the existing condition to be preserved at the preliminary stage, and concluded Foster had not met the showing required to justify enjoining enforcement before a final merits decision.
  • As a result, the statutory $100 contribution limit remained in effect pending further proceedings.
  • A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy intended to preserve the existing condition pending final adjudication; the moving party must satisfy the court that interim relief is justified under the applicable factors (including likelihood of success and the remaining equitable considerations).
  • Contribution limits affecting political speech and association are evaluated under the First Amendment framework applicable to campaign-finance contribution restrictions; courts ask whether the limit is closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important governmental interest.
  • The presence of criminal penalties for violating a contribution restriction is relevant to the practical consequences of enforcement, but it does not by itself establish entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief.

Conclusion

In Foster v. Dilger, the Eastern District of Kentucky addressed a First Amendment challenge to Kentucky’s $100 cap on direct contributions to school-board candidates under KRS § 121.150(6). Although Foster argued the limit significantly restricted political expression and association—especially given the role independent expenditures can play in such elections—the court denied his request for a preliminary injunction and left the statute in force while the litigation continued.