Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)

Facts

  • Terry Gene Bollea (Hulk Hogan), a public figure, sued Gawker Media, LLC after Gawker posted an article about his extramarital affair that included roughly two minutes of excerpts from a secretly recorded sex video.
  • Bollea alleged he did not consent to the recording or to publication of the video excerpts.
  • Bollea first sought a preliminary injunction in federal court; the federal court denied the request on First Amendment prior-restraint grounds.
  • Bollea voluntarily dismissed the federal action and refiled similar claims in Florida state court, again seeking emergency injunctive relief to stop continued publication/distribution.
  • The state trial court entered a temporary injunction against Gawker but did not state reasons in its order.
  • Gawker appealed; the Florida Second District Court of Appeal stayed enforcement pending appeal and reviewed whether the injunction could stand.

Issues

  1. Whether the temporary injunction barring publication/distribution of the article and video excerpts was an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment (and parallel state constitutional protections).
  2. Whether the federal court’s earlier denial of a preliminary injunction collaterally estopped Bollea from seeking similar injunctive relief in state court.

Decision

  • The court reversed the temporary injunction as an unconstitutional prior restraint.
  • The court held the injunction operated as a classic prior restraint and was presumptively unconstitutional absent extraordinary circumstances.
  • The court rejected Gawker’s collateral-estoppel argument, concluding the federal denial of preliminary injunctive relief was not a final judgment on the merits and therefore did not bar the state request for an injunction.
  • Prior restraints on publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringements on First Amendment rights and are permissible only in extraordinary circumstances.
  • Allegedly unlawful publication is ordinarily addressed through post-publication remedies (e.g., damages), not pre-publication suppression through injunction.
  • In assessing restraints on speech, courts consider the speaker’s restraint as well as the context, including whether the subject is a public figure and whether the content bears on matters of public concern or newsworthiness.
  • Collateral estoppel generally requires a final adjudication; an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction does not preclude later litigation (or a renewed injunction request) in another court.

Conclusion

The appellate court set aside the trial court’s temporary injunction because it impermissibly restrained speech before adjudication on the merits, while also holding that the earlier federal denial of preliminary injunctive relief did not procedurally bar the state court from considering (and rejecting) similar injunctive relief.