## Facts

- Georgia amended its weapons law through S.B. 308 (2010), including O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(b), which made it a crime to carry a weapon in certain locations, including “a place of worship.”
- The law’s stated aims included preventing crime and protecting worshippers from being intimidated or threatened about their religious choices while attending services.
- Plaintiffs were GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. (a gun-rights membership organization), The Baptist Tabernacle of Thomaston, Georgia, Inc. (a church), the church’s pastor (Jonathan Wilkins), and a church attendee with a Georgia Weapons License (Edward Stone).
- The individual plaintiffs and the church alleged they wanted licensed congregants (and the pastor) to carry firearms during worship for self-defense but refrained because they feared arrest and prosecution under § 16-11-127(b).
- Plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the “place of worship” restriction as unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Second Amendment (as applied to the states).
- The court had previously denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
- Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, while defendants (the State of Georgia, Governor Sonny Perdue in his official capacity, Upson County, and the Upson County Manager in his official capacity) moved to dismiss.

## Issues

1. Whether Georgia’s prohibition on carrying weapons in places of worship, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127(b), substantially burdened plaintiffs’ religious exercise in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
2. Whether the prohibition on carrying weapons in places of worship violated the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
3. Whether the State of Georgia was immune under the Eleventh Amendment and whether the remaining government defendants were proper parties for prospective relief.

## Decision

- The court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.
- The court dismissed the Free Exercise claim for failure to state a claim because the law was neutral and generally applicable and did not substantially burden religious exercise.
- The court dismissed the Second Amendment claim for failure to state a claim, applying intermediate scrutiny and concluding the restriction was substantially related to important public-safety interests in a sensitive setting.
- The court held the State of Georgia was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed it as a defendant.
- The court dismissed claims against other defendants to the extent plaintiffs failed to show a sufficient enforcement connection or a justiciable controversy.
- The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as moot.

## Legal Principles

- A neutral law of general applicability that incidentally affects religiously associated conduct does not violate the Free Exercise Clause absent a substantial burden on religious exercise.
- A plaintiff does not plead a substantial burden on free exercise merely by alleging a preference to engage in conduct during worship; the complaint must plausibly allege that the law meaningfully restricts religious practice (for example, by preventing worship or requiring violation of a religious obligation).
- The Second Amendment right recognized in *District of Columbia v. Heller* and applied to the states in *McDonald v. City of Chicago* is subject to longstanding, presumptively lawful limits, including restrictions in sensitive places.
- When a regulation restricts where arms may be carried, without eliminating possession for self-defense in the home, courts may apply intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must show an important objective and a substantial relationship between the challenged restriction and that objective; protecting public safety and preventing intimidation in settings where people gather for worship can satisfy that standard.
- The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against a state in federal court absent consent or a valid exception.
- Under *Ex parte Young*, a state officer sued for prospective relief must have a sufficient connection to enforcement of the challenged statute; a general duty to execute laws is not enough.

## Conclusion

In *GeorgiaCarry.Org v. State*, the district court dismissed a § 1983 challenge to Georgia’s ban on carrying weapons in places of worship, holding that the restriction did not substantially burden religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause and, even assuming the conduct implicated the Second Amendment, survived intermediate scrutiny as a place-based limit tied to public-safety concerns in a sensitive setting; the State was also dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was denied as moot.


GeorgiaCarry.Org v. State, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (2011)