## Facts

- A duplex in Lincoln, Nebraska, was conveyed by deed (Oct. 31, 1962) to Minnie Giles and to John V. Sheridan and Helen M. Sheridan “as joint tenants and not as tenants in common,” subject to an existing mortgage the grantees assumed.
- Minnie paid the overwhelming share of the purchase price and later paid most of the mortgage; Helen contributed comparatively little to mortgage and taxes.
- Minnie sued in equity to determine the parties’ respective interests based on their contributions and to obtain partition and related relief.
- After suit was filed, Minnie conveyed an undivided 1/20 of her interest (subject to a reserved life estate) to her nephew, Harley Giles.
- Helen later died, leaving John and three children (two minors), and a guardian ad litem was appointed for the minors.
- Minnie sought to testify to an alleged agreement with Helen that Helen would pay one-half of the costs; the court excluded that testimony under Nebraska’s dead man’s statute.
- The district court fixed ownership shares and awarded Minnie a reimbursement amount secured by a lien; John appealed.

## Issues

1. When a deed to multiple grantees is silent as to fractional interests, what presumption governs, and may it be rebutted by evidence of disproportionate contributions?
2. Whether Minnie’s conveyance of part of her interest to Harley severed the joint tenancy, and if so, to what extent.
3. In a joint tenancy with three or more joint tenants, whether a severing act by one joint tenant severs only that tenant’s share while leaving the remaining joint tenants in joint tenancy with each other.
4. Whether a joint tenant or tenant in common who pays more than a proportionate share of a mortgage on the common property is entitled to contribution and a lien securing reimbursement.
5. Whether Minnie’s fact-pleading was sufficient to support the equitable relief granted.

## Decision

- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decree.
- The court held that Minnie’s conveyance to Harley was an act inconsistent with joint tenancy and severed the joint tenancy as to Minnie’s share, converting that share into a tenancy in common.
- The severance did not destroy the joint tenancy among the remaining joint tenants; they continued to hold their interests in joint tenancy as between themselves.
- The court upheld the trial court’s determination that the presumption of equal shares was rebutted by evidence of Minnie’s disproportionate payments, supporting an equitable allocation of interests.
- The court upheld the award of contribution for Minnie’s excess mortgage payments, secured by a lien against the other co-owners’ interests.
- The court rejected the claim that Minnie’s pleadings were defective, concluding her detailed factual allegations supported the relief.

## Legal Principles

- When a conveyance to two or more persons is silent as to the interest each takes, there is a rebuttable presumption that their interests are equal.
- A joint tenancy may be destroyed by an act of one joint tenant that is inconsistent with joint tenancy, extinguishing survivorship to the extent of the severed share.
- In a joint tenancy of three or more persons, a severing act by one joint tenant severs only that joint tenant’s share; the remaining joint tenants may continue to hold in joint tenancy with survivorship between themselves.
- A joint tenant or tenant in common who pays an encumbrance on the joint estate that benefits the common title is entitled to contribution from co-owners, and equitable relief may include a lien to secure reimbursement.
- Detailed factual allegations may be sufficient in equity to support relief even if the pleading does not expressly label a specific legal theory.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed an equitable decree that (1) treated disproportionate contributions as rebutting equal-share presumptions, (2) recognized a partial severance of a three-party joint tenancy caused by one joint tenant’s conveyance, and (3) granted contribution secured by lien for mortgage payments made for the common benefit.


Giles v. Sheridan, 179 Neb. 257, 137 N.W.2d 828 (Neb. 1965)