## Facts

- John Glover pled guilty (1989) to multiple counts of child molestation and related offenses involving repeated sexual abuse of a child under 14.
- The trial court imposed a 30-year sentence: seven years in prison and the remainder on probation.
- Probation included general conditions and special conditions, including limits on contact with minors and a requirement to attend sexual deviancy counseling.
- After release to probation (1996), Glover was arrested (1997) after contact with a four-year-old girl at church.
- Following a revocation hearing, the trial court found Glover violated general conditions and three special conditions by: (1) direct contact with a minor, (2) volunteer work bringing him into contact with a minor, and (3) failure to attend counseling.
- The trial court revoked probation and ordered Glover to serve ten years in prison, with the remaining balance again on probation.
- Glover moved to vacate the revocation sentence, arguing OCGA § 42-8-34.1(b) limited revocation to a maximum of two years; the motion was denied.
- The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, reading OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) to permit revocation of the balance of probation when any special condition is violated.
- The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that interpretation and application of OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c).

## Issues

1. Whether OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) authorizes revocation of the balance of a probationary sentence whenever a probationer violates any special condition of probation.
2. Whether the phrase “special condition imposed pursuant to this Code section” limits subsection (c) such that it does not apply to all special conditions a court may impose as part of probation.
3. Whether, absent a qualifying subsection (c) trigger, revocation is subject to the general limitation in OCGA § 42-8-34.1(b).

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals.
- The court held OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) does not authorize revoking the balance of probation merely because a probationer violates a special condition of probation.
- The court ruled the Court of Appeals’ interpretation improperly treated limiting statutory language as meaningless and impermissibly expanded revocation authority.
- Because subsection (c) was not properly triggered on this record, the enhanced revocation authority used to impose a ten-year term was unauthorized.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory limits on probation revocation must be enforced as written; courts may not disregard limiting phrases in criminal statutes.
- OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) is a narrow exception that applies only when the proven violation is (1) commission of a felony offense, or (2) violation of a “special condition imposed pursuant to this Code section.”
- A violation of a special condition, without meeting subsection (c)’s textual trigger, does not permit revocation of the entire remaining balance of probation.
- When subsection (c) does not apply, revocation is governed by the general limitation in OCGA § 42-8-34.1(b).

## Conclusion

The Georgia Supreme Court rejected a broad reading of OCGA § 42-8-34.1(c) and held that violating a special condition of probation does not, by itself, authorize revocation of the entire remaining probationary term; absent a qualifying subsection (c) trigger, revocation is constrained by subsection (b)’s general limits.


Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 533 S.E.2d 374 (Ga. 2000)