Facts
- Johnny C. Wilson participated in a 1966 anti–Vietnam War protest at an Army induction center in Atlanta, Georgia.
- While officers removed him from the building, Wilson directed insulting and threatening statements at police, including “I’ll choke you to death” and “I’ll cut you all to pieces.”
- Wilson was convicted in a Georgia superior court on two counts under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6303, which criminalized using “opprobrious words or abusive language” “tending to cause a breach of the peace.”
- He received two one-year misdemeanor sentences.
- The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the convictions and rejected Wilson’s First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.
- Wilson obtained federal habeas relief; a federal district court held the statute unconstitutional, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
- The State, through the prison warden, sought Supreme Court review.
Issues
- Whether Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6303 is facially invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because its terms are overbroad and vague.
- Whether a breach-of-the-peace statute directed at insulting speech is constitutional only if limited to “fighting words” likely to provoke immediate violence by the person addressed.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of habeas corpus relief to Wilson.
- The Court held Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6303 facially unconstitutional.
- Georgia courts had not authoritatively limited the statute to “fighting words” as defined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.
- Because the statute, as construed and applied, reached substantial protected expression and gave inadequate guidance, it was overbroad and vague.
Legal Principles
- “Fighting words” are a narrow category of unprotected speech: personally addressed words with a direct tendency to provoke an immediate violent reaction by the listener.
- A statute regulating speech is facially overbroad when its terms and authoritative constructions extend beyond unprotected speech to cover protected expression, creating a serious risk of deterrence.
- Vague speech restrictions are unconstitutional when elastic terms fail to give fair notice and invite arbitrary enforcement, especially where separating protected from unprotected speech requires close line-drawing.
- A court will not salvage a speech-restrictive statute by imposing a narrowing construction inconsistent with the state courts’ established interpretations.
Conclusion
The Court invalidated Georgia’s “opprobrious or abusive language” statute because state-court applications showed it was not confined to fighting words and therefore punished and deterred protected speech while granting excessive enforcement discretion, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.