Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013)

Facts

  • Vernon F. Minton developed and leased securities-trading software (TEXCEN) more than one year before filing a patent application; a patent issued in 2000.
  • Minton sued NASD and NASDAQ in federal court for patent infringement.
  • Defendants asserted the patent was invalid under the “on-sale bar,” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), based on the earlier lease.
  • The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity; after judgment, Minton raised an “experimental use” theory for the first time, but the court rejected it as waived; the Federal Circuit affirmed.
  • Minton then sued his former lawyers in Texas state court for legal malpractice, alleging they negligently failed to timely raise the experimental-use argument and that he would have won the infringement case absent that error.

Issues

  1. Whether a state-law legal malpractice claim “arises under” federal patent law within 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) when liability depends on resolving an embedded patent-law question.
  2. Whether the embedded patent question in such a malpractice case is “substantial” to the federal system under the Grable framework.
  3. Whether exercising exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent-related malpractice claims would disrupt the congressionally approved federal–state division of judicial responsibilities.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Texas Supreme Court.
  • The Court held that § 1338(a) does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over state-law malpractice claims merely because they require deciding an embedded question of patent law.
  • Although the malpractice claim necessarily raised and actually disputed a patent issue, that issue was not substantial in the Grable sense and federal exclusivity would upset the federal–state balance.
  • The case was remanded for further proceedings in Texas state court.
  • A state-law claim falls within federal “arising under” jurisdiction only if it necessarily raises a federal issue that is actually disputed and substantial, and if federal jurisdiction may be exercised without disturbing the congressionally approved federal–state balance (Grable test).
  • “Substantial” focuses on the importance of the federal issue to the federal system as a whole, not merely to the parties.
  • Patent-law questions litigated hypothetically within a malpractice “case within a case” generally lack systemic substantiality because they do not alter the final federal patent judgment, do not control future federal cases, and do not directly affect existing patent rights.
  • State courts may apply federal patent law when necessary to resolve state causes of action; exclusive federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a) is not triggered by embedded patent issues that fail the Grable substantiality and balance requirements.

Conclusion

The Court ruled that a Texas legal malpractice action premised on alleged mishandling of a patent case did not “arise under” federal patent law for purposes of § 1338(a), because the embedded patent issue was not substantial to the federal system and shifting such cases to federal court would improperly reallocate a traditional area of state authority.