## Facts

- François Holloway and an armed accomplice carried out a series of vehicle takings by confronting drivers after following targeted cars until they were parked.
- The accomplice would display a gun and threaten to shoot unless the driver surrendered the keys.
- The accomplice testified they intended to obtain cars without injuring drivers but would use the gun if a victim resisted or gave him a “hard time.”
- In one incident, when a victim hesitated, Holloway punched the victim in the face; otherwise, there was no additional physical violence.
- Holloway was charged and convicted in federal court of, among other offenses, three counts of carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which required taking a vehicle “by force and violence or by intimidation” “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.”
- The trial court instructed the jury that the statute’s intent element could be satisfied by “conditional” intent: intent to kill or seriously injure if the victim refused to surrender the car.
- The Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review to resolve the meaning of § 2119’s intent requirement.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2119 requires proof that the defendant possessed an unconditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm regardless of the victim’s response.
2. Whether § 2119 is satisfied by proof that the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm if necessary to complete the carjacking (conditional intent).
3. Whether any ambiguity in § 2119’s intent language requires a narrower interpretation under the rule of lenity.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that § 2119 does not require proof of an unconditional intent to kill or seriously harm.
- The government satisfies § 2119’s intent element by proving the defendant intended to kill or seriously harm if necessary to effect the taking.
- The Court focused on the defendant’s state of mind at the moment he demanded or took control of the vehicle by force, violence, or intimidation.
- The Court rejected an interpretation that would effectively convert the mens rea element into a requirement resembling an attempt to kill or harm during the taking.
- The Court concluded that the statutory text and purpose supported inclusion of conditional intent and that the rule of lenity did not apply.
- Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that ordinary usage of “intent” does not include a conditional purpose the actor hopes will not occur.

## Legal Principles

- A statute requiring taking property “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm” may be satisfied by conditional intent: intent to kill or seriously injure if the victim resists.
- For § 2119, the relevant inquiry is the defendant’s state of mind at the precise moment of the coercive demand or taking by force, violence, or intimidation.
- Statutory interpretation should not convert a mens rea modifier into an additional conduct element requiring proof akin to attempted violence.
- The rule of lenity applies only when, after applying ordinary tools of statutory construction, congressional intent remains indeterminate.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 2119 reaches typical threat-based carjackings by requiring proof that, at the moment of the taking, the defendant was prepared to kill or seriously injure if needed to obtain the vehicle, even if the defendant preferred to complete the offense without violence.


Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999)