## Facts

- LaFrench Hopson was indicted in Alabama on February 9, 1971, for first-degree murder arising from a 1970 shooting death of his uncle.
- Hopson left Alabama and went to New York, where he committed another homicide, was convicted, and was incarcerated.
- Alabama authorities initially had difficulty locating Hopson.
- After locating him, Alabama made a good-faith effort to extradite him from New York, but the Governor of New York refused extradition.
- Hopson was ultimately tried in Alabama about five years after indictment, convicted of second-degree murder, and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.
- Hopson moved to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; the trial court denied the motion.
- The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, applying the Barker v. Wingo four-factor test.

## Issues

1. Whether the approximately five-year delay between indictment and trial violated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test, given the defendant’s flight, out-of-state incarceration, and Alabama’s extradition efforts.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Applying Barker v. Wingo’s four factors, the court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that no speedy-trial violation occurred.
- The court treated the five-year delay as not inordinate when assessed in context and in light of the reasons for the delay.
- The court concluded the principal reason for delay was Hopson’s flight and subsequent imprisonment in New York, combined with New York’s refusal to extradite him despite Alabama’s good-faith attempt.
- The court rejected the argument that Alabama was required to pursue both extradition and a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to show good faith.

## Legal Principles

- Speedy-trial claims are evaluated under Barker v. Wingo by balancing: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice.
- Length of delay alone is not dispositive; the delay must be weighed against the reasons for it and the remaining Barker factors.
- Delay substantially attributable to the defendant—such as fleeing the jurisdiction and becoming incarcerated elsewhere—weighs against finding a Sixth Amendment violation.
- When a defendant is held in another state, a good-faith state effort to obtain the defendant’s presence may be shown through an attempt at extradition; the Constitution does not require pursuing every possible mechanism where no controlling authority imposes that requirement.
- Refusal by another state’s executive to extradite may substantially mitigate the prosecuting state’s responsibility for delay in the Barker analysis.

## Conclusion

The Alabama Supreme Court held that the Fifth-year gap between indictment and trial did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the delay was largely explained by the defendant’s flight and out-of-state incarceration, and Alabama’s good-faith but unsuccessful extradition efforts prevented the delay from weighing decisively against the State under Barker v. Wingo.


Hopson v. State, 352 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1977)