## Facts

- Dallas adopted an ordinance creating a Motion Picture Classification Board to classify films as “suitable” or “not suitable for young persons” (under age 16).
- The Board could label a film “not suitable” if, in its judgment, it portrayed brutality, violence, depravity, sexual promiscuity, or extra-marital or abnormal sexual relations in a manner “likely” to incite crime, delinquency, sexual promiscuity, or appeal to minors’ “prurient interest.”
- The ordinance treated a film as “likely” to cause such effects if, in the Board’s judgment, there was a substantial probability minors would view the depicted conduct as “profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly accepted.”
- The ordinance provided criminal penalties and civil remedies, including injunctions and possible exhibitor license consequences.
- If an exhibitor rejected a “not suitable” classification, the Board was required to file suit to enjoin the showing to minors; the court would review the matter de novo.
- The Board classified *Viva Maria* as “not suitable for young persons” without stating reasons; the City sought an injunction to prevent exhibition to minors.
- At trial, Board members referenced scenes involving male-female relationships and “acceptable and approved behavior,” and the trial judge found parts “unsuitable to young people,” issuing an injunction; the state appellate court affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether the ordinance’s standards for restricting minors’ access to films were sufficiently narrow, reasonable, and definite to satisfy the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
2. Whether broad, subjective criteria delegating substantial discretion to officials in a film-classification system render the ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
3. Whether procedural protections (Board-initiated suit and de novo judicial review) can cure vague substantive standards in a prior-restraint scheme.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in an 8–1 decision.
- The Court held the ordinance facially unconstitutional because it lacked “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards” to guide decisionmakers.
- The Court concluded the ordinance’s key terms and predictive judgments about minors’ reactions were too indefinite and invited arbitrary censorship.
- The Court rejected the argument that limiting the scheme to minors or providing de novo judicial review saved the ordinance from invalidity.

## Legal Principles

- A system that conditions exhibition of protected expression on official approval is invalid if it lacks narrow, objective, and definite standards guiding administrators.
- Vague standards chilling First Amendment activity violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement of fair notice and constrain arbitrary enforcement.
- The government may regulate minors’ access to some expression more broadly than adults’ access, but regulations affecting protected expression must still be drafted with sufficient clarity.
- Procedural safeguards in a censorship or classification scheme do not compensate for undefined or highly subjective substantive criteria.

## Conclusion

The Court invalidated Dallas’s film-classification ordinance because its undefined, subjective standards (including “sexual promiscuity,” “abnormal sexual relations,” and “prurient interest,” tied to speculative judgments about minors’ responses) granted excessive discretion and failed to provide clear, administrable limits required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.


Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968)