## Facts

- A series of six murders near Evansville, Indiana, generated intense local media coverage and community hostility in the surrounding counties.
- Leslie Irvin was arrested in April 1955; local officials issued widely publicized statements asserting that he had confessed to the murders.
- Irvin was indicted in Vanderburgh County, Indiana, and obtained a change of venue to adjoining Gibson County, a rural county with a small jury pool.
- Irvin sought a second change of venue on the ground that Gibson County was also saturated with prejudicial publicity; the trial court denied the request.
- During jury selection, 430 prospective jurors were examined; 268 were excused for cause because they held fixed opinions that Irvin was guilty.
- Of the 12 jurors seated, 8 acknowledged before trial that they believed Irvin was guilty, though each stated an ability to decide the case based on the evidence presented at trial.
- Irvin was convicted of murder and sentenced to death; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether extensive and inflammatory pretrial publicity and resulting juror preconceptions deprived Irvin of a fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether Indiana’s limitation on changes of venue violated due process when a fair jury could not be obtained in the transferee county.
3. Whether federal courts in habeas proceedings must independently assess the record for constitutional jury prejudice despite state-court findings.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the federal court’s denial of habeas relief.
- The Court held that Irvin was denied a fair trial because the jury that convicted him was not impartial in fact in light of pervasive prejudgment and community hostility.
- The Court ruled that Indiana’s venue statute was not unconstitutional on its face because state law permitted additional venue changes when needed to secure an impartial jury.
- The Court held that federal courts had a duty to independently evaluate the voir dire record and surrounding circumstances when assessing a claim of unconstitutional jury prejudice.
- The judgment denying habeas corpus was vacated and the case remanded to allow the State a reasonable time to retry Irvin consistent with due process.

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires a fair trial, and a jury trial is not fair unless the jury is impartial.
- Juror exposure to publicity or some prior impressions does not automatically establish constitutional unfairness; the inquiry is whether jurors can set aside impressions and decide solely on trial evidence.
- Where pretrial publicity and community sentiment are so pervasive that a substantial portion of the venire holds fixed views of guilt, the record may show actual bias and may support a conclusion that the trial setting was constitutionally intolerable.
- Jurors’ assurances of impartiality are not controlling when the totality of circumstances and voir dire demonstrate a significant risk that the verdict rests on prejudgment rather than evidence.
- A change of venue may be constitutionally required when local prejudice makes selection of an impartial jury unlikely; the constitutional violation stems from the failure to secure an impartial jury, not from a venue statute as such.
- In federal habeas review, courts must independently evaluate whether the defendant received an impartial jury under federal constitutional standards.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court set aside Irvin’s conviction because pervasive, inflammatory pretrial publicity and demonstrated juror bias deprived him of an impartial jury and therefore a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring habeas relief and an opportunity for retrial in a constitutionally acceptable forum.


Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)