Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 321 Conn. 172, 136 A.3d 1232 (Conn. 2016)

Facts

  • Barbara A. Izzarelli began smoking Salem cigarettes as a teenager in the early 1970s and smoked for decades.
  • She developed laryngeal cancer in the late 1990s and later sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company under the Connecticut Product Liability Act.
  • The complaint asserted strict liability and negligent design based on alleged intentional design choices that increased daily consumption and, as a result, exposure to carcinogens.
  • Evidence at trial included claims that the manufacturer manipulated nicotine delivery and used additives to increase the frequency and intensity of smoking.
  • A federal jury found for Izzarelli, and the District of Connecticut entered judgment in her favor.
  • On appeal, the Second Circuit certified a question asking whether Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment (i), referencing “good tobacco,” barred the strict design-defect claim absent adulteration or contamination.

Issues

  1. Whether comment (i) to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, including its reference to “good tobacco,” precludes a strict products liability design-defect claim against a cigarette manufacturer based on evidence of intentional design to increase consumption and carcinogen exposure, without proof of adulteration or contamination.
  2. What test governs strict products liability design-defect claims in Connecticut: the ordinary consumer expectation test or the modified consumer expectation (risk–utility) test.
  3. How “obvious danger” language in comment (i) functions within Connecticut’s design-defect framework.

Decision

  • The Connecticut Supreme Court answered the certified question in substance: no, comment (i) does not categorically bar the described strict liability design-defect claim.
  • The court held the modified consumer expectation test is Connecticut’s primary strict products liability test and, for this case, the sole applicable test.
  • The court concluded that comment (i)’s “obvious danger” examples (including “good tobacco”) are considerations within the multifactor modified consumer expectation analysis, not dispositive immunity from liability.
  • The case was returned to the Second Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the court’s interpretation of Connecticut law.
  • Connecticut’s primary test for strict products liability design defects is the modified consumer expectation test, which incorporates a multifactor risk–utility assessment.
  • In complex design cases where ordinary consumers cannot form meaningful safety expectations about product design features, the modified consumer expectation test applies to the exclusion of the ordinary consumer expectation test.
  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment (i) “obvious danger” language, including “good tobacco,” does not operate as a categorical bar to strict liability design-defect claims under Connecticut law.
  • Under the modified consumer expectation test, the trier of fact may consider factors such as product utility, likelihood and severity of harm, feasibility of safer alternatives, ability to reduce risk without undue cost or loss of utility, and the user’s ability to avoid danger.
  • A design-defect claim may proceed where the theory is that manufacturer design choices increased risk beyond what would be expected from the product’s generally known dangers.

Conclusion

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that “good tobacco” language in Restatement § 402A comment (i) does not automatically preclude strict liability design-defect claims against cigarette manufacturers; instead, Connecticut courts must evaluate such claims under the modified consumer expectation (risk–utility) test, particularly in technically complex design cases.