## Facts

- Andrew Jenkins was prosecuted in Michigan for a fatal stabbing.
- Jenkins did not report the killing to authorities immediately and surrendered about two weeks later.
- At trial, Jenkins testified and claimed he acted in self-defense.
- On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Jenkins about his two-week prearrest silence to challenge the credibility of his self-defense account.
- In closing argument, the prosecutor again argued that Jenkins’s failure to report the killing promptly undermined his credibility.
- Jenkins was convicted of manslaughter; state courts affirmed.
- On federal habeas review, Jenkins claimed the impeachment use of his prearrest silence violated the Fifth Amendment (as applied through the Fourteenth) and due process; lower federal courts denied relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits using a criminal defendant’s prearrest silence to impeach credibility after the defendant chooses to testify.
2. Whether using prearrest silence for impeachment denies due process or fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed, holding 7–2 that impeachment with prearrest silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
- The Court held that using prearrest silence to impeach a testifying defendant also did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process where the silence was not induced by governmental action.
- The Court stated that although the Constitution permits such impeachment, states may restrict or exclude it under their own evidentiary rules.

## Legal Principles

- The Fifth Amendment does not bar impeachment of a defendant who testifies using the defendant’s prearrest silence.
- A defendant who voluntarily testifies may be subject to credibility impeachment, and such impeachment serves the trial’s truth-determining function.
- Due process concerns that bar impeachment with post-warning silence do not apply absent governmental inducement or assurances connected to the silence.
- Jurisdictions remain free to set evidentiary limits on impeachment by prearrest silence, including excluding it as more prejudicial than probative.

## Conclusion

The Court held that when a defendant testifies, the prosecution may use the defendant’s prearrest, pre-warning silence to impeach credibility without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of fundamental fairness, while leaving states discretion to regulate the practice as a matter of evidence law.


Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980)