Facts
- Dorothy Kubala attended a Catholic Charismatic Renewal “healing service” held at St. Augustine’s Church in North Branford, Connecticut, a parish within the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation.
- The service was open to the general public and included prayer at the altar.
- Kubala alleged that during the service she approached the altar, was prayed over, and then “rested in the spirit,” causing her to fall backward.
- No one caught her as she fell, and she struck the back of her head on the floor.
- Kubala alleged she suffered severe and painful injuries from the fall.
- Kubala sued the Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, St. Augustine’s Church, and a priest associated with the church, Robert Rousseau.
- Her complaint sounded in negligence, alleging the defendants:
- failed to exercise the degree of care and skill ordinarily used by a church in conducting the healing service,
- failed to adequately train and supervise those responsible for catching participants who might fall, and
- failed to take reasonable safety precautions (such as providing “catchers” or similar safeguards).
Issues
- Whether the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate negligence claims that would require determining the proper standard of care for conducting a Catholic Charismatic Renewal healing service involving “resting in the spirit,” or whether the First Amendment bars such review as impermissible church–state entanglement.
- Whether Connecticut’s religious-freedom statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b, supports dismissal where imposing tort liability would substantially burden the defendants’ exercise of religion.
Decision
- The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The court characterized Kubala’s theory as a clergy-malpractice claim because deciding negligence would require a court to decide what conduct, training, supervision, and safety measures are “ordinarily and customarily” appropriate for this religious practice.
- The court held that resolving the claims would require inquiry into religious doctrine and practice connected to the healing service and “resting in the spirit,” which the First Amendment does not allow.
- The court also relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b as consistent support for barring liability that would substantially burden religious exercise in the manner alleged.
- On appeal, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed in a short per curiam decision and adopted the trial court’s reasoning as its statement of the facts and applicable law.
Legal Principles
- Civil courts may apply neutral principles of law to disputes involving religious entities only when adjudication does not require evaluating religious doctrine, ritual, or internal church practice.
- A negligence claim can be nonjusticiable when liability would turn on defining how clergy or a church should perform a religious rite or service; courts often describe such claims as “clergy malpractice.”
- When a plaintiff’s proposed standard of care is tied to what is appropriate within a religious service (for example, whether and how participants should be physically assisted during a ritual), adjudication risks excessive entanglement forbidden by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
- Cases involving conduct that can be judged by secular legal standards without evaluating religious practice (such as sexual abuse) are treated differently; by contrast, claims centered on the conduct of a religious ritual may be barred when the court would have to decide what the ritual should include.
- A lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the First Amendment requires dismissal rather than a merits ruling.
Conclusion
Kubala’s negligence claims were dismissed because the court concluded that determining whether the diocese, parish, and priest acted unreasonably in conducting a Catholic Charismatic healing service—particularly with respect to “resting in the spirit” and the use, training, and supervision of “catchers”—would require the court to set and apply a religiously grounded standard of care, creating unconstitutional church–state entanglement and, under Connecticut law, burdening religious exercise.