## Facts

- Robert William Latimer, a Saskatchewan farmer, killed his 12-year-old daughter, Tracy Latimer, by carbon monoxide poisoning.
- Tracy had cerebral palsy and was fully dependent on others for care.
- Tracy underwent many surgeries and experienced substantial pain.
- Tracy could not take ordinary pain medication because it would interfere with her anti-epileptic medicine.
- Tracy’s parents could have administered pain medication through a feeding tube, but chose not to pursue that option.
- Tracy’s parents also considered placing her in a group home, but decided against it.
- In 1993, Tracy was scheduled for another surgery, which doctors expected would cause significant pain.
- After learning the surgery would proceed, Latimer decided to end Tracy’s life.
- Latimer placed Tracy in his vehicle and caused her to inhale carbon monoxide until she died.
- Latimer was convicted of second-degree murder at his second trial.
- The trial judge withdrew the defense of necessity from the jury and later attempted to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum by granting a case-specific constitutional exemption.
- The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the exemption and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with 10 years’ parole ineligibility, while upholding the conviction.
- Latimer appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on both conviction and sentence.

## Issues

1. Was there an evidentiary basis to leave the defense of necessity with the jury, and did the trial judge’s timing in withdrawing it make the trial unfair?
2. Did the jury instructions—particularly comments touching on sentencing—render the trial unfair or deny Latimer any right to jury nullification?
3. Does the mandatory sentence for second-degree murder (life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years) violate s. 12 of the Charter as applied to Latimer, and can a court grant a case-specific constitutional exemption from a mandatory minimum?

## Decision

- The appeal was dismissed.
- The conviction for second-degree murder was affirmed.
- Necessity was not available on the facts and was properly withheld from the jury; the timing of the ruling did not make the trial unfair.
- The trial judge’s instructions did not create unfairness; there is no legal right to jury nullification and no entitlement to an instruction that invites it.
- The mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment with 10 years’ parole ineligibility was not cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 in these circumstances.
- A case-specific constitutional exemption from an otherwise valid mandatory minimum sentence was not an available remedy; the sentencing judge erred in granting one.

## Legal Principles

- The defense of necessity requires: (1) urgent and clear peril, (2) no reasonable legal alternative, and (3) proportionality between the harm inflicted and the harm avoided.
- A trial judge should not leave a defense with the jury unless there is an “air of reality” to each required element; if no properly instructed jury could acquit on that basis, the defense may be withdrawn.
- Necessity is a narrow excuse; it does not justify a planned killing where the circumstances are not an immediate emergency and lawful options exist, even if those options are difficult.
- Jury nullification is a factual power of juries, not a legal right of the accused; courts must not invite or encourage verdicts contrary to law.
- Under s. 12 of the Charter, a punishment is unconstitutional only if it is grossly disproportionate—so excessive as to outrage society’s standards of decency.
- Courts do not grant case-by-case constitutional exemptions to avoid applying a mandatory minimum that is constitutionally valid; if a sentencing provision is unconstitutional, the usual remedy addresses the law, not an individual carve-out.
- Exceptional mercy, if warranted, lies in executive clemency rather than judicial alteration of a valid mandatory sentence.

## Conclusion

In *Latimer v. The Queen*, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the defense of necessity could not be put to the jury because Tracy’s situation, while tragic, did not present an urgent emergency, lawful alternatives existed, and the proportionality requirement could not be met where the harm inflicted was the intentional taking of life. The Court also held that jury nullification is not an accused’s right and that the jury instructions did not make the trial unfair. Finally, the Court upheld Parliament’s mandatory sentence for second-degree murder—life imprisonment with 10 years’ parole ineligibility—finding no gross disproportionality under s. 12 and rejecting any case-specific constitutional exemption from the statutory minimum.


Latimer v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 3 (2001)