## Facts

- Leo Gasse and Jimmy Paxson bought a used Sea Ray pleasure boat with gasoline engines and a gasoline generator used to power accessories, including air conditioning.
- While anchored at Lake Mead, Gasse and Robin Lewis slept in the cabin with the generator running to power the air conditioner.
- The next day, Gasse was found dead and Lewis barely breathing; witnesses reported the engines were not running.
- Evidence supported that carbon monoxide came from the generator, not the engines, and that the generator exhaust could migrate into the cabin under certain conditions despite proper ventilation.
- When sold new, the model included written carbon-monoxide warnings from the generator maker and a marine trade association; evidence indicated the warnings primarily addressed engine-exhaust risks rather than generator-exhaust migration into the cabin during generator-powered air-conditioning use.
- Lewis and Gasse’s heirs sued the manufacturer in strict products liability, alleging the boat was defective and unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate warnings about the generator-related carbon-monoxide risk.
- At trial, the court rejected plaintiffs’ proposed instruction defining “adequate warning” under Nevada strict-liability law and instead gave generalized instructions; the jury twice requested clarification on what constituted an adequate warning.
- The jury returned a defense verdict, finding no defect or unreasonable danger.

## Issues

1. In a strict-liability failure-to-warn case, whether a trial court errs by giving only general “stock” warning instructions and leaving adequacy to jurors’ common sense when a party requests a specific, evidence-supported instruction on warning adequacy.
2. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to an instruction defining “adequate warning” as requiring communication of dangers from product use or foreseeable misuse under Nevada strict products-liability law.

## Decision

- The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Sea Ray and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held plaintiffs were entitled to a theory-specific instruction on warning adequacy because their requested instruction was supported by evidence and accurately stated Nevada law.
- The court concluded the generic instructions were insufficient in a case involving a technical, non-obvious mechanism of harm and that the refusal to instruct more specifically was prejudicial error.
- The jury’s repeated requests for clarification confirmed that the instructions did not provide meaningful legal guidance on warning adequacy.

## Legal Principles

- Strict liability may be imposed even if a product is faultlessly manufactured when it is unreasonably dangerous to place in users’ hands without suitable and adequate warnings concerning safe and proper use.
- An adequate warning must adequately communicate dangers that may result from the product’s use or foreseeable misuse.
- A party is entitled to jury instructions on its evidence-supported theories; general, abstract, or stock instructions are inadequate if a proper request for a specific instruction on an important point is made.
- Although warning adequacy is typically a fact question for the jury, jurors must be instructed with legally meaningful criteria that reflect strict-liability warning doctrine rather than undefined “common sense.”

## Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court ordered a new trial because the central dispute concerned the adequacy of carbon-monoxide warnings, and the jury required a specific strict-liability instruction defining “adequate warning” to evaluate that theory in a technically complex setting.


Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 119 Nev. 100, 65 P.3d 245 (Nev. 2003)