Facts
- Leo Gasse and Jimmy Paxson bought a used Sea Ray pleasure boat with gasoline engines and a gasoline generator used to power accessories, including air conditioning.
- While anchored at Lake Mead, Gasse and Robin Lewis slept in the cabin with the generator running to power the air conditioner.
- The next day, Gasse was found dead and Lewis barely breathing; witnesses reported the engines were not running.
- Evidence supported that carbon monoxide came from the generator, not the engines, and that the generator exhaust could migrate into the cabin under certain conditions despite proper ventilation.
- When sold new, the model included written carbon-monoxide warnings from the generator maker and a marine trade association; evidence indicated the warnings primarily addressed engine-exhaust risks rather than generator-exhaust migration into the cabin during generator-powered air-conditioning use.
- Lewis and Gasse’s heirs sued the manufacturer in strict products liability, alleging the boat was defective and unreasonably dangerous due to inadequate warnings about the generator-related carbon-monoxide risk.
- At trial, the court rejected plaintiffs’ proposed instruction defining “adequate warning” under Nevada strict-liability law and instead gave generalized instructions; the jury twice requested clarification on what constituted an adequate warning.
- The jury returned a defense verdict, finding no defect or unreasonable danger.
Issues
- In a strict-liability failure-to-warn case, whether a trial court errs by giving only general “stock” warning instructions and leaving adequacy to jurors’ common sense when a party requests a specific, evidence-supported instruction on warning adequacy.
- Whether plaintiffs were entitled to an instruction defining “adequate warning” as requiring communication of dangers from product use or foreseeable misuse under Nevada strict products-liability law.
Decision
- The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Sea Ray and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held plaintiffs were entitled to a theory-specific instruction on warning adequacy because their requested instruction was supported by evidence and accurately stated Nevada law.
- The court concluded the generic instructions were insufficient in a case involving a technical, non-obvious mechanism of harm and that the refusal to instruct more specifically was prejudicial error.
- The jury’s repeated requests for clarification confirmed that the instructions did not provide meaningful legal guidance on warning adequacy.
Legal Principles
- Strict liability may be imposed even if a product is faultlessly manufactured when it is unreasonably dangerous to place in users’ hands without suitable and adequate warnings concerning safe and proper use.
- An adequate warning must adequately communicate dangers that may result from the product’s use or foreseeable misuse.
- A party is entitled to jury instructions on its evidence-supported theories; general, abstract, or stock instructions are inadequate if a proper request for a specific instruction on an important point is made.
- Although warning adequacy is typically a fact question for the jury, jurors must be instructed with legally meaningful criteria that reflect strict-liability warning doctrine rather than undefined “common sense.”
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court ordered a new trial because the central dispute concerned the adequacy of carbon-monoxide warnings, and the jury required a specific strict-liability instruction defining “adequate warning” to evaluate that theory in a technically complex setting.