## Facts

- Petitioners were tried in federal court in 1991 for willful destruction of United States property at Fort Benning, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361.
- Before trial, petitioners moved to disqualify the district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
- The motion relied primarily on the judge’s conduct during a 1983 bench trial involving petitioner Bourgeois arising from an earlier Fort Benning protest.
- Petitioners claimed the judge showed impatience and hostility toward the defense and their political and religious views, citing comments limiting political speech, restrictions on cross-examination, admonitions to counsel and witnesses, and a sentence viewed as excessive.
- Petitioners also cited the judge’s trial-management comments in the 1991 case aimed at preventing the proceedings from becoming extended political debate while allowing limited motive testimony.
- The district court denied recusal and petitioners were convicted; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” standard incorporates the extrajudicial-source principle limiting disqualifying bias to sources outside judicial proceedings.
2. Whether judicial rulings, remarks, or case-management decisions in current or prior proceedings can require recusal under § 455(a), and under what circumstances.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed.
- The Court held that the extrajudicial-source principle applies to § 455(a) as an important factor, but it is not an absolute requirement.
- Judicial rulings and ordinary courtroom administration almost never justify recusal; intrajudicial conduct warrants disqualification only when it shows deep-seated favoritism or antagonism making fair judgment impossible.
- The judge’s comments and rulings in the 1983 and 1991 proceedings reflected ordinary trial control and did not demonstrate the required extreme bias.

## Legal Principles

- Section 455(a) requires disqualification when a reasonable observer would question the judge’s impartiality, but “bias” and “partiality” retain a pejorative meaning tied to wrongful predisposition.
- The presence of an extrajudicial source may support a bias claim but does not automatically establish disqualifying partiality; the absence of an extrajudicial source does not categorically bar recusal.
- Opinions formed from facts introduced or events occurring in current or prior proceedings are not grounds for recusal unless they display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that makes fair judgment impossible.
- Adverse rulings, critical remarks, and efforts to manage proceedings—standing alone—ordinarily do not support a § 455(a) bias or partiality motion.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 455(a) generally does not require recusal based on a judge’s prior rulings or ordinary courtroom conduct, and that disqualification is warranted on intrajudicial conduct only when it reveals extreme, entrenched favoritism or hostility that renders fair adjudication impossible.


Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)